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ABSTRACT
Essays on Empirical Analysis of Multi-unit Auctions
– Impacts of Financial Transmission Rights on the Restructured Electricity
Industry. (August 2005)
Hailing Zang, B.S., Fudan University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Steven L. Puller
This dissertation uses recently developed empirical methodologies for the study
of multi-unit auctions to test the impacts of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs)
on the competitiveness of restructured electricity markets. FTRs are a special type
of financial option that hedge against volatility in the cost of transporting electricity
over the grid. Policy makers seek to use the prices of FTRs as market signals to
incentivize efficient investment and utilization of transmission capacity. However,
prices will not send the correct signals if market participants strategically use FTRs.
This dissertation uses data from the Texas electricity market to test whether the
prices of FTRs are efficient to achieve such goals. The auctions studied are multi-
unit, uniform-price, sealed-bid auctions.
The first part of the dissertation studies the auctions on the spot market of the
wholesale electricity industry. I derive structural empirical models to test theoretical
predictions as to whether bidders fully internalize the effect of FTRs on profits into
their bidding decisions. I find that bidders are learning as to how to optimally bid
above marginal cost for their inframarginal capacities. The bidders also learn to bid
to include FTRs into their profit maximization problem during the course of the first
year. But starting from the second year, they deviated from optimal bidding that
includes FTRs in the profit maximization problems. Counterfactual analysis show
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that the primary effect of FTRs on market outcomes is changing the level of prices
rather than production efficiency. Finally, I find that in most months, the current
allocations of FTRs are statistically equivalent to the optimal allocations.
The second part of the dissertation studies the bidding behavior in the FTR
auctions. I find that FTRs’ strategic impact on the FTR purchasing behavior is
significant for large bidders – firms exercising market power in the FTR auctions.
Second, trader forecasts future FTR credit very accurately while large generators’
forecasts of future FTR credit tends to be biased upward. Finally, The bid shad-
ing patterns are consistent with theoretical predictions and support the existence of
common values.
vTake joy, my King, in what You see.
To my parents
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the 1980s, several countries initiated electricity industry reforms. The U.S. elec-
tricity industry also experiences the transformation from the one that builds upon
regulated vertically integrated monopolies to the one that promotes efficient whole-
sale and retail competition. Most of the restructuring involves the disintegration of
generation, transmission and distribution ownership and require open access to the
transmission grid. There are several landmarks of policy orders during this transition
that is worth mentioning. In 1978, the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA)
stimulated independent power plants coming into the sector if they meet certain cri-
teria. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct92) further removed some barriers that
prevents the entry of independent power plants and initiated the development of an
open access regime of the transmission grid. Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC) issued Order 888 in 1996 that implements the open access regime and
encourages the formation of Independent System Operators (ISOs) to manage the
transmission grid. Paul Joskow concludes the essences of Order 888 as the following:
“transmission owners must provide access to third parties to use their transmission
networks at cost-based maximum prices, make their best efforts to increase transmis-
sion capacity in response to requests by third parties willing to pay for the associated
costs, and shall behave effectively as if they are not vertically integrated when they use
their transmission systems to support wholesale market power transactions, treating
third party transaction schedules on their networks that are supported by firm trans-
The journal model is Journal of Econometrics.
2mission agreements equivalently to their own use of their transmission network.”1 In
December 1999, The Commission’s Order 2000 promotes the formation of Regional
Transmission Organizations (RTOs) over larger regions and ask that transmission
owners yield the operation of their transmission to the RTOs. Due to the slow pace
of implementation of Order 2000, in June 2002, FERC proposed “Standard Market
Design (SMD)” which further emphasized independent transmission provision.
Open access to transmission is a crucial component in the restructuring of the
electricity industry. However, how to incentivize transmission investment to relieve
bottle-neck constraints on the electricity market is still under discussion. On both the
wholesale and retail side of the electricity market, market signals – market prices, are
introduced to incentivize investment and consumption. The returns from investment
on the wholesale and retail side are mostly decided by “market rates”. However,
the transmission network typically remians a regulated monopoly until recently and
transmission investment is regulated through a regulated rate of return. Following
the restructuring of the wholesale market, transmission policies are currently under
hot debate as to whether transmission investment decisions should be regulated or
be market driven. By using market signals, we allow merchant transmission investors
to build capacity based on market incentivized returns. But if we use market-driven
forces, the signals provided by the market should be accurate to reflect the actual
scarcity or abundance of transmission resources. Otherwise, a biased signal will in-
centivized over- or under-investment.
Researchers (Hogan (1992, 2002), Bushnell & Stoft (1996, 1997)) as well as pol-
icy makers (for example, FERC’s July 2002 Standard Market Design) propose to
use Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) to help market participants hedge against
1See Joskow (forthcoming 2005).
3price volatilities due to transmission congestions on the wholesale electricity mar-
ket. Interested market participants can buy FTRs through auctions conducted by
grid operators. Brunekreeft (2003) summarized several ways to incentivize merchant
transmission investment, one of these is to award the FTR auction revenue to mer-
chant transmission investors. There are already some active merchant transmission
investments in the United States market2 and the investors rely on the FTR auction
revenue to justify the benefit of the new transmission investment or the upgrade of
the transmission line even if they are not awarded FTR revenues.
Since FTR auction revenue is a market signal to merchant transmission investors,
This signal can only be efficient when there is no failure in the markets where FTRs
are involved. If FTRs can be strategically employed by market participants to en-
hance their market power on the wholesale market, then FTR prices (or FTR auction
revenues) are not purely reflective of the true valuation of transmission capacity. Fol-
lowing the proposal of FTRs, a lot of discussion has been going on as to whether FTRs
would have any impacts on the competitiveness of the wholesale electricity market and
whether FTR prices would be efficient in conveying the valuation of marginal trans-
mission capacity. Bushnell(1999), Stoft (1999), Joskow and Tirole (2000, forthcoming
2005) discuss theoretically the impacts of FTRs that would have on the wholesale elec-
tricity market. Gilbert, Neuhoff and Newbery (forthcoming) study efficient auction
designs for selling FTRs. This dissertation serves to empirically address the question
as to whether FTRs are strategically manipulated by market participants who own
FTRs and whether FTR prices are affected by such strategic manipulation. These
empirical results help policy makers have a better knowledge of FTRs’ impact in the
real world and use FTRs as a better policy instrument.
2The most active one is the transmission interconnection between PJM (Pennsyl-
vania, Maryland and New Jersey) and New York City and Long Island.
4The difficulties in studying FTRs’ impacts originate from the difficulties in the
empirical study of multi-unit auctions. Different from single unit auction, where bid-
ders submit to the auctioneer one price bid, the bids submitted by each bidders in
multi-unit auctions are composed of multiple price-quantity pairs. Consequently in
multi-unit auctions, the strategy space is much larger than that in single unit auc-
tions. The major difficulty becomes how to handle such large strategy space. Further,
there are different formats for multi-unit auctions. One form of multi-unit auction
is uniform-price auction where the bidders pay the market clearing price for all the
bids awarded; the other form is called discriminatory-price auction, where bidders
pay their own awarded bids. An original theory paper by Wilson(1979) collapses all
the uncertainties into the uncertainty of market clearing price. Following Wilson,
more theory paper about properties of multi-unit auctions emerge, including revenue
equivalence comparison (see Back and Zender (1993)) between different formats of
multi-unit auctions, equilibrium strategies under different assumptions of valuation
distribution structures (see Ausubel and Cramton (2002)), etc. The surging of em-
pirical study of multi-unit auctions starts in late 1990s due to the more frequent
practice of multi-unit auctions, for example the spectrum auction, the auctions in
the electricity market and Treasury Bill auctions. Wolfram (1998) studies the bids
on England and Wales electricity market to test whether two largest suppliers are
exercising market power. Hortac¸su (forthcoming) studies the multi-unit auction in
Turkish Treasury Bill auction and structurally backs out bidders’ valuation by impos-
ing valuation independence. He then use those backed-out valuation to empirically
compare revenues under uniform-price and discriminatory-price auctions. Hortac¸su
and Puller (2004) use bids on the Texas electricity market to test bidders’ bidding
behavior and is the closest paper to my first part of the dissertation.
This dissertation is composed of two major parts. In order to test whether
5FTR prices are affected by strategic considerations, first we need to ask the ques-
tion as to whether FTRs are strategically used by market participants. The first
part is to empirically test FTRs’ impacts on the owners’ strategic behavior on the
wholesale market. More specifically, since market participants supply power in the
deregulated wholesale electricity market through auctions, I ask whether FTRs affect
firms’ bidding decisions. The wholesale market auction is in the format of multiunit,
uniform-price, sealed bid auction. To date, virtually no empirical work has tested
the existence and extent of such an issue on the wholesale electricity market. I also
conduct counterfactual studies which give policy makers quantitative evidence as to
whether the current allocations of FTRs are optimal.
Several researchers (as mentioned above) have made theoretic predictions that
the allocation of FTRs can have important effects on the efficiency of the electricity
market. Since FTR owners collect FTR revenue when positive congestion costs occur,
the FTR revenue comes into the profit maximization decision of the FTR owners. In
its simplest form, unit FTR credit3 equals Pimport−Pexport, where Pimport is the price
in the import-constrained market4 and Pexport is the price in the export-constrained
market. A local monopoly owning FTRs in the import-constrained market will have
additional incentives to raise the price (Pimport) in its regional market to increase the
unit FTR credit; similarly, a local monopoly owning FTRs in the export-constrained
market will have incentives to lower the price (Pexport) in its own market to increase
the FTR credit, ceteris paribus.
3Unit FTR credit is the “rebate” that the grid operator will pay to the FTR owners
on the wholesale market when positive congestion costs occur.
4By import-constrained, I mean that the regional market cannot import any more
of the electricity due to the binding transmission constraint. Similarly, by export-
constrained, I mean that the regional market cannot export any more of the electricity
due to the binding transmission constraint.
6Based on newly developed empirical methodologies to analyze multi-unit auc-
tions, I derive structural empirical models to test these theory predictions. The
empirical methodology is an application of the Wilson (1979) share auction model
and the supply function equilibrium model of Klemperer and Meyer (1989). This
paper extends the work of Hortac¸su & Puller (2004). By making assumptions on
the structure of the bid functions, the empirical models incorporate bidders’ beliefs
regarding uncertainties during the auctions. Using rich firm-level bidding data and
plant-level costs from the Texas electricity market, I test whether bidders fully inter-
nalize the effect of FTRs on profits in their bidding or use FTRs merely as hedging
instruments against volatile transportation costs. The empirical models give several
testable hypothesis on firms’ bidding strategies regarding FTRs. I find bidding be-
haviors converge towards theoretical equilibrium predictions over time with respect to
firms’ physical inframarginal capacity. With respect to FTRs, bidding strategies are
converging towards optimal bidding during the course of the first year, but deviated
from optimal bidding starting from the last period of the sample.
In terms of efficiency effects, in theory, when firms are net buyers in an import-
constrained market, FTRs will improve market efficiency by eroding firms’ local
monopsony market power. When firms are net sellers in an import-constrained mar-
ket, FTRs will distort market efficiency by enhancing firms’ local monopoly market
power. In the counterfactual study, I construct optimal bids that fully internal-
ize FTRs in firms’ bidding decisions to test the ”worst/best case scenario” in the
market. Counterfactual market outcomes reveal that even if firms fully internalize
FTRs in their bidding, the marginal production efficiency is not affected much and
that the effects of FTRs are mostly reflected in price level changes. I also conduct
counterfactual studies to determine the optimal allocations of FTRs to major firms.
Considering demand uncertainty, I find that in most months, the actual allocations of
7FTRs are statistically equivalent to optimal allocations of FTRs in the improvement
of wholesale market price signal efficiency.
The second part of the dissertation serves to empirically answer the question as
to what the prices of FTRs are composed of, how we interpret market participants’
purchasing behavior and what the magnitude of different components that constitute
the price of FTRs are, for example, will market power effect be significant in the price
of FTRs? In this part, the choice of the number of FTRs is endogenously decided
during the bidding for FTRs, and I study the auctions for FTRs by integrating
the FTR auction with the consequent wholesale market competition together. By
integrating the two games together, I am able to test how FTR prices are affected
by bidders’ market power on the second-stage competition. Also the model I have
facilitates testing the existence of bid shading5 in the bid schedule they submit –
another form of market power in the auctions when the bidders are buyers.
The types of bidders in the FTR auctions are different from those on the wholesale
electricity market. In the wholesale electricity market real-time auctions, the bidders
are power generation firms6. In the FTR auction, however, the bidders include not
only power generation firms, but also traders and customer serving entities. For
traders, they do not have any power generating facilities and do not serve customers,
but they make profit in the electricity market by arbitraging price differences, for
example trading electricity among different locations due to price differences. Traders
also need FTRs to hedge against price volatility in their electricity transactions on the
5Bid shading refers to the gap that is between the bidder’s true valuation and the
bidder’s bid price corresponding to each quantity level.
6In some market in the U.S., for example, the New York market, traders are
allowed in the bidding to sell electricity on the wholesale electricity market. Such
bidding is called ”virtue bidding”, meaning that even if the participant does not own
any generation, it still can bid into the wholesale market. But virtue bidding was not
introduced in the Texas market in the sample period I have for this dissertation.
8wholesale market if they have trading positions on the wholesale market. The major
reason for generators to buy FTRs is to protect themselves against price volatilities
on the wholesale electricity market which I will explain in the next chapter. As
was explained in the earlier part, FTRs can have some strategic impacts on the
wholesale market competition, such impacts, in theory, should be transmitted to the
price of FTRs as well. I derive empirical models that test the bidding strategies
individually for traders and generators. Theory implies: Aside from hedging reasons,
since generators have market power that’s affected by the ownership of FTRs, the
generators should include in their valuation the market power effect – additional
benefit by using FTRs in the wholesale market competition. My empirical models
test whether the market power effects are significant.
The FTR auctions are also in the format of multiple unit, uniform price, sealed-
bid auctions. The empirical model for the FTR auction tests whether the bid sched-
ules are consistent with equilibrium bidding strategies implied by theory. However,
due to the limitations of the data, I am not able to use a fully structural model
to back out bidders’ true valuation, but rather, I use a reduced form model to test
the essences of theory implications. I construct different measures of the expected
future unit FTR credit and find that traders are forecasting future unit FTR credit
very accurately; Large bidders who are generators forecast future unit FTR credit
systematically higher than actual unit FTR credit while small generators’ prediction
on future unit FTR credit is very noisy. For the market power effect: Large bidders
significantly included FTRs’ impacts on market power into their bidding decisions
while small bidders bidding strategy does not reflect such an concern. Different as-
sumptions of value structures would lead to different empirical predictions and the
empirical reduced form model used in this part of the dissertation represents a gen-
eral model which allows value affiliation among the bidders. The empirical findings
9strongly supports the existence of a common value component in the value structure
and the bid shading patterns for traders and large generators are consistent with
multi-unit uniform-price theory implications.
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CHAPTER II
THE TEXAS ELECTRICITY MARKET
The grid operator in Texas is called the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ER-
COT). The restructuring of the electricity market in Texas took place in August 2001.
By the end of year 2001, the Texas market had 70,000 megawatts (MW) of installed
generation, 37,000 miles of transmission and 57,600 megawatt hours (MWh) of peak
demand.
A. How Electricity Is Traded in ERCOT
Unlike many the deregulated markets elsewhere in the United States where there are
centralized power exchanges, or power is dispatched purely through auctions, 95% of
power in the Texas electricity market is based on bilateral trading between buyers
and sellers, i.e., the power transactions are settled by contracts between buyers and
sellers. The remaining 5% is traded in the real-time market, also called Balancing
Energy Service market where power is balanced between suppliers and consumers in
the real time. In the real-time market, consumers do not respond to price, making
demand perfectly inelastic. Congestion and congestion cost1 are determined through
this real-time market.
To supply electricity, firms operating in Texas must first give ERCOT information
about their generation schedule one day ahead. No auction mechanism is involved
in the one day ahead report. Then at the real time, firms can choose to bid into
the spot market to provide balancing energy service so that in the real time, actual
1ERCOT uses a linear programming software to solve for the unit congestion
cost called “shadow prices”(similar to a Lagrangian Multiplier) on each congested
transmission line. Detailed calculation shadow price can be referred in Appendix A.
11
demand meets actual supply. The real-time market can be regarded as a residual
market conditional on the scheduled supply one day ahead. In the real-time market
(or the balancing market or the spot market: the names for this market will be used
exchangeably but refer to the same market), a uniform-price, multi-unit, sealed-bid
auction is conducted. It is hoped that through the market mechanism in the real-time,
efficiency can be achieved if firms are perfectly competitive. This analysis focuses on
the real-time market to test whether the spot market’s price signal is further distorted
by the ownership of FTRs if firms are already exercising local monopoly power.
Firms submit their bids to ERCOT no later than one hour ahead of the real
time. Then the real-time market clears 20 minutes ahead for every following 15-
minute interval. Although the time periods are divided into 15-minute intervals, the
bid stack is fixed for each hour. Firms submit an hourly bid schedule for each regional
market. Balancing bids are capped at $999/MWh.
B. Transmission Management and FTRs in ERCOT
When transmission lines are not congested2, the ERCOT market can be regarded
as integrated because the transportation cost is zero, or the marginal value of an
additional transmission capacity is zero3. When the transmission lines are congested,
the entire ERCOT market is separated into sub-markets with different prices known
as zones. The price differences among the markets constitute the transportation cost
(or congestion cost) for using the transmission line between two markets (Or you can
2Although the cause of congestion is complicated in engineering terminology, we
can simply regard congestion as the case when the power flow along the transmission
line reaches its upper-limit capacity of the transmission line.
3We can envision this “congestion cost” as a shadow price (a Lagrangian multi-
plier) attached to a binding constraint (the transmission capacity) when we solve a
constrained optimization problem. When the constraint is not binding, the shadow
price (the Lagrangian multiplier) is zero.
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think of them as arbitrage costs). If we think of the transmission line as a “bridge”,
then without the rights, the merchant who wants to ship power across the “bridge”
needs to pay “tolls”. However, with transmission rights, he does not need to pay
the “toll”. The “toll” is the transportation cost, or congestion cost. Without FTRs,
a firm cannot secure a stable profit stream since the congestion costs, which are
determined by the real-time markets, are volatile. Owning FTRs allows the firm to
use the transmission line for “free” so that the profit is more stable.
Transmission constraints are most likely to bind between zones and we call such
congestion “zonal congestions”. Within each zone, there are infrequent and random
congestions called “local congestions”. In the year 2001, there were three zones –
South, North and West, and two major transmission constrains (South → North,
and West → North). In 2002, a fourth zone was added - the Houston zone and
there were four major transmission constraints: South → North, West → North,
South → Houston and North → West. In 2003, the North → West constraint was
dropped. Table I is a list of congestion frequency among most significantly constrained
transmission interfaces from 2002 to 2003.
FTR program began in Texas on February 15, 20024. There is no centralized
Table I. Frequency of Congestion on Major Transmission Constraints
(Jan. 2002 - May 2003, all hours)
S → N W → N S → H N → W
2002 26.6% 25.9% 26.7% 3.3%
2003 7.3% 7.3% 7.3% –
4This date coincides with the direct assignment of congestion cost.
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secondary market for FTRs5, but FTRs can be traded bilaterally between market
participants6. ERCOT auctions both monthly and annual FTRs. The annual auction
distributes 60% of total FTRs with the remaining 40% distributed among each month.
The FTRs awarded in the annual auction can be used for the entire year, while the
monthly auctioned FTRs can only be used for the month specified. Once the bidders
are awarded FTRs in the annual auction, the FTRs can be applied to any hours
within the year. If the FTRs are awarded through monthly auctions, then the FTRs
can only be applied to hours within the month specified. In view of possible market
power effect, the rule stipulates that the individual can only holds no more than 25%
of the entire stock of FTRs.
The FTR auction format in 2002 is uniform-price sealed-bid multi-unit auction.
The bidders need to bid for each type of FTRs separately. In year 2003, the format
for the FTR auction changed to multi-unit combinatorial auctions, i.e., the bidders
buy different types of FTRs together as a bundle. Since both theory and empirical
study for combinatorial auction, especially for multi-unit combinatorial auction are
almost non-existent to my best knowledge, this study focuses on the FTR auctions
in 2002. The auction for N → W FTR did not have many market participants in
year 2002 and consequently this directional FTR is eliminated in the year 2003. In
this research, I ignore the auction for this type of FTRs. In year 2002, on average
there around 15 bidders in each auction (except N → W direction, which has less
than 10 bidders in each round) with the annual auction has the largest number of
participation.
5ERCOT does not monitor the secondary transactions.
6The bilateral trading is not registered with ERCOT and I do not have the infor-
mation. Conversations with ERCOT staff members and industry practitioners reveal
that the secondary trading is not liquid.
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Once the bidder is awarded the FTRs, she needs to pay to the grid operator
an amount that equals the FTR price times the FTR amount times the total time
period in which the FTRs can be used. For example, if the bidder is awarded 10
units of S → N FTRs in the March FTR auction and the auction clearing price is
$5, she needs to pay a total amount of $5× 10× 31days× 24hours = $37200. On the
second-stage wholesale electricity market, she can then collect FTR credits whenever
congestion happens in the direction of S → N in March. In year 2002, the FTR
revenue from the FTR auction totaled $91 million, exceeded ex-post FTR credit by
$62.4 million; in year 2003, the FTR revenue totalled $27 million, while the ex-post
FTR credit was $30.5 million; in year 2004, total FTR revenue was $34.5 million, and
the realized FTR credit was $43.9 million. Summer months always have the highest
FTR prices and the FTR prices decrease from year 2002 to year 2003. This may be
partially due to the changing of auction format which is beyond the discussion of this
dissertation, and also reflect to some degree the learning of the bidders.
For this research, I look only at the first interval in the hour 18 (i.e. 18:00 -
18:15). Aggregate demand for electricity rises to peak demand around 1pm and stays
stable till 8pm on an average day. In hour 18, firms usually have ample time to
increase or decrease a unit’s output so that there are only minimal inter-temporal
adjustment costs in this hour.
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CHAPTER III
THE IMPACT OF FTRS ON STRATEGIC BIDDINGS ON THE WHOLESALE
ELECTRICITY MARKET
A. Theories
Wilson (1979)’s seminal paper on multi-unit auction offers a direction in performing
empirical structural analysis on multi-unit auctions. Wilson collapses all the uncer-
tainties that bidders have into the uncertainty of market clearing prices. Klemperer
& Meyer (1989) explore the supply function equilibrium where the choice variable
is upward sloping supply functions with multiple price and quantity pairs. Green
& Newbery (1992) first applied the supply function concept in the study of the UK
electricity market. Wolfram (1998) empirically studied multi-unit auctions with unit-
specific bids in the England and Wales electricity market. Hortac¸su & Puller (2004)
developed a structural method to analyze multi-unit uniform price auctions with port-
folio bids in ERCOT. My paper extends their analysis to situations where the market
is congested.
In most deregulated electricity markets, firms sign contracts with their customers
at a fixed price PCit and a fixed quantity. A firm can over/under-schedule in one day
ahead from its actual total contract quantity, with the over/under-scheduled amount
QCit sold/bought in the real-time market. Total actual contracted quantity is then
the sum of day-ahead scheduled quantity qDAit and QCit. A positive QCit means that
the supplier is net short on its total contract volume in the real time and needs to buy
back from the real-time market to supply its customer; a negative QCit means that
the supplier is net long on its contract in the real-time market and needs to sell to
the real-time market. Usually the residual contract quantity (QCit) in the real-time
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market is covered by a financial contract fixing the customers’ price at the contract
price (PCit) if the customer gets QCit from the real-time market
1. According to
the financial contract, if the real-time market price is higher than the contract price,
then the supplier needs to pay its customer the difference for the contract quantity
delivered in the real time and vice versa. Then the revenue from residual contract
position (QCit) in the real-time market is then (PCit−pct)QCit if pct is the spot market
price.
In the real-time market, a firm faces its own residual demand which is constructed
by taking the aggregate real-time demand and subtracting the firm’s competitors’
supply. Below equation shows a firm’s profit under the static setting without any
uncertainty, i.e., a firm knows exactly the realization of its residual demand during a
congestion period:
piit = (Sit(p
c
t)−QCit)pct+SP (pct , p˜t)FTRit+PCit(qDAit +QCit)−Cit(Sit+qDAit ) (3.1)
where Sit(p
c
t) is the supply function (the bid function) in the real-time and p
c
t is the
real-time market clearing price. Cit is firm i ’s cost, p˜t represents prices in the other
regional markets at time t, FTRit represents the number of FTRs owned by firm
i on a directional congested line at time t and SP (pct , p˜t) is the corresponding unit
congestion cost as a function of prices in each separated market.
The first term in the profit function is the revenue in the real-time market; the
second term is the revenue from FTR payments; the third term is the revenue from
selling the contract quantity and Cit is the cost of production. I ignore the sunk cost
of purchasing FTRs in the profit function without any harm to the following analysis.
Unit congestion cost (SP (pct , p˜t)) is the marginal value for an additional unit
1These kinds of contracts are called Contract for Differences (CfD).
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of transmission capacity, and is also the unit FTR credit payment. It is calculated
as a linear function of regional prices with the coefficients decided by the line “shift
factors”. The shift factors indicate the impacts of power flow through one transmission
line on the other transmission lines. When a generator send power through one
transmission line, there will be part of the electricity “shifted” to other transmission
lines. (The detailed calculation of the unit shadow price can be found in the Appendix
A.) In its simplest form, the shadow price for a certain congested transmission line
can be written as:
SP (P ) = α1PN + α2PS + α3PW + α4PH (3.2)
PN PS, PW , and PH are prices in the North, South, West and Houston region respec-
tively. When the transmission lines are congested, prices in each market differ. αis
are constants from combinations of monthly average shift factors.
In all auction analysis, we need to model players’ beliefs regarding the distribu-
tion of market outcome. In a multi-unit auction, Wilson (1979) uses H(p, Sit(p)) as
players’ beliefs of the distribution of market clearing price given their own submitted
supply functions. More specifically, we can write:
H(p, Sit(p)) = Pr(p
c
t ≤ p|Sit(p)) = Pr(Sit(p) +
N∑
j 6=i
Sjt(p) ≥ D˜(p)|Sit(p)) (3.3)
where D˜(p) is the demand with a random noise. H(p, Sit(p)) is the probability that
the market clearing price is lower than the bid price or the probability that there are
excess supply on the market. Based on uncertainty about the market clearing price,
the optimization is on the expected profit:
max
Sit(pt)
Π =
∫ p¯
0
piitdH(p, Sit(pt)) (3.4)
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where pi is defined in equation (3.1).
By first order condition, we have2:
pt − C ′it(Sit + qDAit ) = (Sit(pt)−QCit + SP ′(pt, p˜t)FTRit)
HS
Hp
(3.5)
The left hand side (LHS) of equation (3.5) is the market clearing price-cost markup.
Inside the parenthesis of the right hand side (RHS) of equation (3.5) are the quantities
composed of real-time market clearing quantity Sit(pt), the net contract position in
the real-time market QCit and FTR quantity adjusted by shift factors. Sit(pt)−QCit
is the net real-time market sales. For example, if a firm sells 100 MW into the
balancing market, but it still has contract obligation of 50 MW not scheduled day
ahead, then it needs to buy back 50 MW from the real-time market, resulting in net
selling 50 MW (100 MW - 50 MW) in the real-time market. There can also be cases
where a firm is a net buyer (Sit(pt)−QCit < 0) in the real-time market.
In the import-constrained market, the shift factor adjustment (SP ′(pt, p˜t)) is
positive. Then based on equation (3.5), FTRs give the firm a “pseudo” additional
capacity as if the firm were able to ship power from a lower priced market without any
cost and sell it at a higher local price, receiving the arbitrage revenue. However the
firm does not need to physically ship power across transmission lines because FTRs
are financial instruments. This is intuitively the reason why FTRs create additional
incentives to exercise market power: the firm has more “pseudo imported capacity”
to enhance its market power in its own location. Same logic applies to firms holding
FTRs in the export market where the shift factor adjustment is negative. Then FTRs
act as if the firm ships power to other higher-priced markets so that it has less capacity
in its own market. In this case FTRs serve as “pseudo exported capacity” to reduce
2The derivation can be found in Appendix B.
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the firm’s local market power. But since this capacity is “pseudo”, an interesting
empirical question is whether the firm realizes its “pseudo capacity” in the market.
HS
Hp
is the ratio of densities. Let us imagine that the horizonal axis repre-
sents quantity and the vertical axis represents price, then HS is the changing in
the H(p, Sit(p)) distribution due to a leftward/rightward shift of bid curve (holding
bid prices being constant). The higher the amount that the bidder supplies at a given
price, the higher the probability that there is excess supply, HS is therefore positive.
Hp is the changing in H(p, Sit(p)) distribution due to an upward/downward shift of
bid curve (holding bid quantities being constant). As bid quantities are fixed, the
higher the price that the bidder requests to be paid, the higher the probability that
the price is greater than the market clearing price, and this term is therefore also
positive. Then the whole term HS
Hp
is positive, an element that affects the markup
amount through uncertainty.
To explore the uncertainties in detail, I group the uncertainties into two cate-
gories: 1), firm’s private information, and 2), randomness in the aggregate demand.
In equation (3.5), there are two pieces of firm’s private information that adds to
uncertainties in the market: The first is the net contract positions (QCit) in the real-
time market and the second is the FTR ownership. I assume that bidders’ private
information (the net contract position on the balancing market and FTRs) are addi-
tively separable to its bid slope in their bid schedule. More specifically, we can write
the bidder’s supply schedule as Si(p,QCi, FTRi) = αi(p) + βi(QCit, FTRi)
3. αi(·)
and βi(·) are flexible functional forms. Intuitively, This assumption serves to ensure
3Notice that in the function of βi(.), we do not know how FTRi affects QCit
(because FTRs are determined before the decision of QCit). But if FTRs affect QCit,
that effect is on the one day ahead and not on the balancing market. By conditioning
on QCit, we are able to detect the FTR’s effect on the real-time market participants’
behavior.
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that bidder’s private information only add noises to the bid function horizontally but
won’t change the shape of the bids. This assumption is similar to the assumption
in Klemperer & Meyer (1989)’s derivation of supply function equilibrium where they
assume that in a short time period, noises only translate demand horizontally but do
not pivot demand. From a firm’s perspective, locally it faces its own residual demand
which is the perfect inelastic aggregate demand minus its rival’s supply. Since the
private information are all additive noises, the residual demand will also be translated
horizontally without being pivoted by the private information.
Second, the aggregate demand (D˜(pt)) itself contains some randomness. I assume
that there are idiosyncratic additive errors to the expected demand (D¯(pt)), i.e.,
D˜(pt) = D¯(pt) + t, where t is random noises independent of private information
and D¯(pt) is the expectation of future demand. Under the above assumptions, the
first-order condition in equation (3.5) can be reduced to4:
pct − C ′it(Sit + qDAit ) =
(Sit(p
c
t)−QCit + SP ′(pct)FTRit)
−RD′it(pct)
(3.6)
From equation (3.6), all the uncertainties can be captured by residual demand slope
RD
′
it(p
c
t) at every price level. Rather than simulating the H(p, Sit(p)) distribution
each time period, which requires tremendous computational burden, I can now only
focus on the estimation of residual demand slope at each price level to measure the
uncertainty component in the auction. The above analysis also carries through with
the same results when the bidder is risk averse. The proof for a risk averse bidder
can be found in Appendix D. My structural estimation is based on equation (3.6).
4detailed derivation can be found in the Appendix C
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B. Empirical Model
1. Structural Estimation Equation
Based on equation (3.6), I can test whether or not the term SP ′(pt)FTRit is significant
in equation (3.6). If the parameter before SP ′(pct)FTRit is statistically equivalent to
one, then firms fully internalized FTRs into their bidding strategies: treating FTRs
the same as their net physical balancing market sales. If the parameter is statistically
insignificant, then FTRs are merely hedging instruments. The parameters will also
reveal the magnitude of deviation from optimal behavior. The empirical structural
model can be written as the following:
pct − C ′it(Sit + qDAit ) = β1
Sit(p
c
t)−QCit + β2SP ′(pct)FTRit
−RD′it(pct)
+ it (3.7)
where the LHS is the price cost markup at the market clearing point. On the RHS,
Sit(p
c
t) − QCit is the net power supplied in the real-time market; SP ′(pct)FTRit is
the FTR quantity adjusted by shift factors and RD
′
it(p
c
t) is the slope of the residual
demand at the market clearing point. β1 reflects a firm’s bidding strategy with regard
to its inframarginal capacities. β2 reflects the effect of FTRs – the “pseudo capacity”
– on the firm’s bidding strategy and can be treated as the weight a firm puts on FTRs
relative to its net balancing market physical sales in the bidding.
Denoting β1 × β2 as γ1, we can rewrite our previous equation (3.7) as:
pct − C ′it(Sit + qDAit ) = β1
Sit(p
c
t)−QCit
−RD′it(pct)
+ γ1
SP ′(pct)FTRit
−RD′it(pct)
+ it (3.8)
Based on equation (3.8), β2 can be recovered by β2 =
γ1
β1
and we can test the following
sequence of hypothesis:
H0: β2 = β1 = 0 perfect competitive case – the bidder is perfectly competitive not
only with regard to net physical balancing market sales but also to FTRs, the
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pseudo quantity.
H1: β2 = β1 = 1 optimal strategic equilibrium bidding – the bidder is optimally ex-
ercising market power unilaterally not only with regard to its net physical bal-
ancing market sales, but also to FTRs’ pseudo quantity.
Relaxing the above joint hypothesis, I can further test:
H2: γ2 = β1 relaxing the constraint that β1 = 1, the bidder internalize FTRs identi-
cally as its own net physical balancing market sales.
H3: β1 = 1 Optimal strategic bidding only with regard to net balancing market phys-
ical sales.
2. Data
Based on equation (3.8), I need information on bid, cost, demand and FTRs. My
data set includes the real-time market bid stack, hourly generation data, unit cost
information, real-time balancing market demand data and FTR auction results. All
the data are confined to weekdays.
• Balancing bid data: each bidder’s hourly bids into each zone.
• Hourly generation data: whether a unit is available and operating during each
hour, the location, the day-ahead scheduled amount of generation per unit and
the real time actual amount of generation per unit. This data set also consists
of a unit’s engineering characteristics such as the minimum and maximum gen-
eration capacity available in each time period. These information are used to
construct the marginal cost curves.
• Unit cost data: the marginal fuel cost of each unit is estimated using the direct
fuel (gas or coal) costs and the unit’s generation efficiency (heat rate). The
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marginal cost of each unit is also composed of environmental cost (SO2 and
NOx permit price) and variable operation and maintenance (O & M) costs.
Each unit has a constant marginal cost reflecting the above elements until it
reaches its capacity. The marginal cost for each unit is assumed to be infinite
after a unit’s generation capacity is reached. I measure each unit’s marginal
cost with methods that are standard in the electricity economics literature. I
use the same data as Hortac¸su and Puller (2004) and the detail of the cost
measurement can be found in the appendix of Hortac¸su and Puller (2004).
• Demand data: the 15-minute real-time market clearing price and the zonal
amount of electricity demanded in the real-time.
I confine my study to “local monopolies” since the theory applies to firms with local
monopoly power. I focus on TXU in the North zone and Reliant in the Houston zone.
Reliant owns around 55% of total generation in the Houston zone and TXU owns
around 60% of total generation in the North zone. If we compare Reliant and TXU
with other firms in the balancing market from August 2001 - July 2002, Reliant and
TXU combined realized almost 65% of total sales in the real-time market. TXU and
Reliant are also important because they were active purchasers of FTRs throughout
my sample period.
3. Measurement of Each Variable
Variables needed for the estimation of equation (3.8) are measured as the followings:
Residual Demand Slopes (RD
′
it(p
c
t)) In the auctions, bid functions take the form
of step functions. Since the residual demand is derived by subtracting the rival’s
supply function (bids) from the aggregate demand (which is perfectly inelastic in
the real-time), the residual demand is also a step function. For a step function,
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the slope for each point is either 0 or ∞. A firm should have some prior on the
shape of a relatively smooth residual demand to choose its bid schedule. To get
a smoother residual demand, I use non-parametric kernel estimation to smooth
out the residual demand without assuming any functional forms. I estimate the
residual demand function using the following kernel regression:
pct(RD) =
∑N
n=1 pnK(
RD−RDn
h
)∑N
n=1K(
RD−RDn
h
)
(3.9)
where n is the bid steps, N is the total bid steps for a single bid function, h is
the smoothing parameter, and K(·) is the kernel function. In this estimation I
use a normal kernel, with
K(
RD −RDn
h
) =
1
(2pi)1/2
exp−
(
RD−RDn
h
)2
2 (3.10)
The residual demand slope can be measured by taking derivatives of equation
(3.9). h is selected according to the ad-hoc rule, where:
h = std(RDn)n
− 1
5 (3.11)
std(RDn) is the standard deviation within the sample at each time period, and
n is the sample size. Due to large dimensionality of the data set, the ad-hoc
method quickens the computing speed without losing much accuracy.
Market Clearing Price and Quantity The market clearing price (pct) and quan-
tity (S(pct))is at the intersection of firm i ’s bid schedule and the realization of
its residual demand RDit. Sit(p
c
t) − QCit is then the net physical balancing
market sales for firm i at the market clearing price.
Residual Cost To construct a marginal cost curve, I first need to get each unit’s
flexible capacity on the balancing market. Most units cannot decrease their
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output down to zero. There are two measures in the data that give a hint of the
minimum amount of output that needs to be sustained for each unit: 20% of
the unit’s maximum capacity (which is used in Hortac¸su and Puller (2004))and
the reported minimum unit capacity. I define the maximum of the above two
measures as the minimum required capacity to be running for each unit. The
flexible capacity for each unit is then the difference between its maximum gen-
eration capacity and the minimum required capacity for operating derived as
above. To construct the marginal cost curve, I stack the units with their flexible
capacities according to an ascending cost rule. Since I am studying the balanc-
ing market (or the residual market), I re-center the origin to the day-ahead
scheduled amount of generation because any increase or decrease of production
in the real-time originates from this day-ahead scheduled production. To avoid
the start-up cost adjustment problem, I only focus on units that are already
operating during previous hours.
Markup Once the market clearing price and quantity is found, I calculate C ′it(Sit(p
c
t))
– the marginal cost of supplying the market clearing quantity. The markup is
measured as pct − C ′it(Sit).
4. Recover Private Information: Net Contract Position (QCit)
I have in data one piece of private information – the FTR ownership, but I do not
have data on firm’s net contract position QCit in the real-time market. To measure
contract quantities (QCit) that have gone into the balancing market, Hortac¸su &
Puller (2004) recover QCit by finding the intersection point between the bid function
and the marginal cost function, such as point A in Figure 1 where P(Q) is the bid
function and MC is the marginal cost function. The intuition is that a firm will bid
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Fig. 1. QC When No Congestion
higher than marginal cost when it is a net seller on the balancing market, and bid
lower than marginal cost when it is a net buyer on the balancing market to save
its own production cost. In my case, however, the observed intersection point
QCit,obs is composed of the true QCit (QCit,true) and FTRs. To understand this, we
can rewrite our equation (3.7) as
pct − C ′it(Sit + qDAit ) = β1
(Sit(p
c
t)− (QCit,true − β2SP ′(pct)FTRit))
−RD′it(pct)
+ it, (3.12)
and let
QCit,obs = QCit,true − β2SP ′(pct)FTRit (3.13)
Intuitively, ifQCit,true > 0, the firm must buy the residual contract quantity (QCit,true)
from the real-time market but the FTRs allow it to import the FTR quantity for
“free”. Such a pseudo import quantity reduce the residual contract quantity to
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QCit,obs in the real-time market so that the firm has more flexible capacities and
market power is increased.
According to equation (3.13), I can still use the intersection point to identify
QCit,obs(the quantity combined of QCit,true and FTRs), but I cannot separately iden-
tify QCit,true from FTRs without further assumptions to recover the QCit,true. Fur-
thermore, the congestion status I observe is the ex-post realization, I need to have
a metric that indicates the probability that the ex-post realized congestion is ex-
ante forecasted. Only when a firm forecasts future congestion, it will bid to include
FTRs. Notice that during non-congestion intervals (or a firm forecasts a future non-
congestion), firms’ profit functions do not include FTR credit revenue since congestion
cost is zero, and hence the intersection of bids with cost curves reflects QCit,true
5. In
order to measure the true contract quantity on the balancing market when a firm
perceives future congestion and bids accordingly, we need to know the indicators of
future congestion and the stable factor in the contracts6 through time so that non-
congestion and congestion periods can be related.
Sample Selection To determine how probable congestion will be, I construct a
variable called “frequency of congestion (freqoc)” as the rough probability of
5There might be questions as to whether a firm has the ability to affect the conges-
tion outcome. Since the balancing service market is only a residual market, the bids
on the balancing market mostly affect the price on the market, but not the congestion
outcome. If a firms’ schedule one day ahead is the major source of congestion, then it
can show willingness or unwillingness to relieve congestion through its bids. But usu-
ally balancing bids alone cannot cause congestion. Bids on the balancing market are
finalized one hour ahead, so firms know the current market condition such as weather,
market aggregate demand, etc., which is quite stable around hour 18:00 and conges-
tion is well expected. This paper assumes that because congestion is exogenous on
the balancing market and firms expect future market congestion outcome with some
confidence since the “future” is not far away, they can update their information and
change their bids accordingly. For example, from August 2002 - December 2002,
Reliant and TXU on average change their bids three times before the finalizing stage.
6The elements that are related with contracts are: real total contract quantity,
day-ahead scheduled quantity and real-time residual contract obligations.
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congestion for time period 18:00 - 18:15. This index is measured by dividing the
total number of congestions intervals during 13:00 - 17:00 by the total number
of intervals during that time period7. From January 2002 - May 2003, 72% of
total congestion occurred when the frequency of congestion in the afternoon was
greater than 50% and 87% of total non-congestion occurred when the frequency
of congestion in the afternoon was less than 50%. These numbers indicate that
freqoc is an accurate predictor of congestion. For this study, I focus on time
intervals 18:00 - 18:15 when freqoc was greater than 50%. This means that my
selected sample include some congested intervals, but also some non-congestion
intervals with perceived congestion.
Stable Factor I regard the total contract quantity as the most stable element related
with contracts over time (at least within one week). We can observe a firm’s
day-ahead scheduled quantity, but we do not know whether it under- or over-
scheduled in the day ahead. As was mentioned before, during time periods when
a firm perceives a future non-congestion and bid accordingly, the intersection of
bid curve with cost curve gives the net true contract position on the real-time
market. Combined with day-ahead scheduled quantity, I can back out a firm’s
actual total contract quantity (QCTit ) during that time interval by Q
CT
it = q
DA
it +
QCit. I restrict to samples with very low freqoc (freqoc < 20%) and back out
the true total contract quantity (QCTit ) using the above methods. The variation
within a week for the backed-out contract quantity is mostly less than 10% and
sometimes even less than 1%. I calculate the average of the contract quantity
(Q¯CT ) for each week and assume that this is the actual contract quantity that
7Bids need to be finalized an hour ahead (i.e., 17:00 for the bidding for hour 18:00
- 19:00).
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the firm needs to deliver to its customer each day during the week at this time
interval.
Measure QCit,true After finding the actual total contract quantity (Q¯
CT ), I can re-
cover QCit,true by relating the total contract quantity (Q¯
CT ) to its day-ahead
schedule (qDAit ) during my selected sample periods: QCit,true is then recov-
ered by subtracting the day-ahead schedule from the total contract quantity
(QCit,true = Q¯
CT
it − qDA). Table II shows the summary statistics of the QCs
as measured above in both “mostly likely” congestion and non-congestion peri-
ods for Reliant and TXU. QCobs (the actual intersection point of bid and cost
curves without adjusting for FTRs) during most likely congestion periods are
also listed in the third row for each firm. For comparison purpose, the absolute
magnitude of the market clearing quantity Sit(p
c
t) are given in the fourth row
for each firm.
On average, residual contract positions (QCtrue) during congestion periods are larger
than the numbers during non-congestion periods. If a firm strategically deploys its
contract quantities into day-ahead (qDA)and real-time (QC), then QCs should reflect
such behavioral difference but is beyond the scope of the analysis in this dissertation.
5. Apply to the Notion of Supply Functions
Klemperer & Meyer (1989)’s supply function is derived by assuming additive noises
to the residual demand. They argue that firms submit multi-unit bids because of
uncertainty in the location of residual demand. If a firm knows for sure where the
residual demand lies, it can do as well by just bid only one point to equalize marginal
revenue with marginal cost and maximize its profit. The authors argue that when
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Table II. Comparison of QCs in Different Scenarios
Feb. 2002 - May 2003; 18:00 - 18:15; freqoc > 0.5
mean s.e. min max
Reliant congestion (QCtrue) 761.68 1137.31 -1691.75 3254
non-congestion (QCtrue) 210.88 351.07 -400 1601
congestion (QCobs) 492.27 575.47 -1000 2619
Sit(p
c
t) (congestion) 350.42 364.46 0 1400
TXU congestion (QCtrue) 624.79 1242.12 -3092 3407
non-congestion (QCtrue) 444.91 533.22 -1750 2320
congestion (QCobs) 400 493.95 -250 2380
Sit(p
c
t) (congestion) 332.19 465.22 0 2017
Note: “congestion” refers to intervals with freqoc> 0.5;“non-congestion” refers to intervals with freqoc < 0.5.
31
demand is translated horizontally by uncertainty, firms have a positively sloped supply
function, rather than a vertical Cournot supply function or a horizontal Bertrand
supply function8. My assumption of private information serving to affect the residual
demand position but not the slope is in compliance with the conditions for an upward
sloping supply function.
In this structural estimation, I add noises to the ex-post realized residual demand
curve to simulate demand uncertainty. Theory indicates that if a firm is optimizing,
it should do so along each bid point. I shift residual demand horizontally by adding
noises randomly drawn from a normal distribution with a standard deviation of 300
MW9. If the clearing point is the same as the previous shifting (either the clearing
price or the quantity), I drop that observation since it is redundant. Hence the
resulting clearing points from the shifting of residual demand should be reflective of
the bid points “supposedly” be cleared on a single bid curve each day. In this way,
my estimation results show the optimality of the entire bid schedule.
C. Estimation
Table III gives summary statistics of the variables in equation (3.8). All numbers are
in absolute values10. Both Reliant and TXU are in the import zone with variable
importing FTRs through time. Both Reliant and TXU on average price differently
from marginal costs, but their markups vary substantially over time.
To detect the evolution of strategies over time, I divide the sample into three
8By vertical, I mean that the horizontal axis is quantity while the vertical axis is
price.
9The standard deviation of daily demand is around 250MW and the stand devia-
tion of weekly demand during the hour 18 is around 400MW.
10When firms are decreasing their supply in the real time, the markup and the
market sales are negative.
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Table III. Summary Statistics for Reliant (Houston) and TXU (North)
Feb 2002 - May 2003; 18:00 - 18:15; freqoc > 0.5
Reliant (Houston) mean s.d. obs
Markup 28.90 115.74 78
Net Market Sale (S - QCtrue) 533.03 629.25 78
FTR (S → H) 140.56 54.40 78
TXU (North) mean s.d. obs
Markup 26.82 92.33 78
Net Market Sale (S - QCtrue) 1035.74 793.97 78
FTR (S → N) 117.63 39.79 78
FTR (W → N) 100.01 57.54 78
periods: Period 1: February-June 2002; Period 2: July-December 2002; Period 3:
January-May 2003. Historically, period 2 shows more congestion since summer peak
demands are within the sample. Period 1 and Period 3 are off-peak and shoulder
months, but for the month of March, April, October and November, generation and
transmission outages are often in ERCOT.
1. Metrics of Optimality
This section provides several qualitative metrics in the testing of optimality with
FTRs in the bids.
a. Distance From Actual Bids to Optimal Bids
First I check how far apart the actual bids are from the “optimal” ones. FTRs are
acting as “pseudo quantities” that shifts the bid curve: “QCtrue” is shifted leftward
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Table IV. Closeness to “Optimal” Bids: Sˆ(pt)− S∗(pt)
(Feb 2002-May 2003, 18:00 - 18:15, freqoc > 0.5)
Period mean (mw) s.d. obs.
Reliant
1 695.22 892.66 30
2 -155.23 937.87 31
3 229.514 483.98 17
TXU
1 719.29 1166.32 30
2 66.67 639.69 31
3 -64.22 529.69 17
Note: Sˆ(pt): actual bids; S∗(pt): optimal bids.
(reduced) by FTRs to “QCobs” according to equation (3.13). To get the bids that
fully internalize FTRs, I keep the original bid shape so that β1 is not affected, and
shift the bid in a way that it crosses the marginal cost curve at the “optimal” point
where β2 = 1 in equation (3.13) (QCit,obs = QCit,true − SP ′FTRit). I measure the
quantity deviation between actual and optimal bids at the same price level to assess
the optimality with FTRs in the actual bids. Table IV gives the summary statistics
of the distance deviations.
If β2 = 0, or the firm does not internalize FTRs into its bidding decision, the
bid curve should lie to the right (the bid curve is not shifted) of the “optimal” bid
curve, i.e., corresponding to each price level the actual quantity bids should have a
larger quantity than the optimal quantity bids. Note that in Period 2, the mean for
Reliant is negative, meaning that Reliant shifted the bid curve so much that it is to
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the left of the “optimal” bids. The absolute magnitude of the closeness of actual bid
curve to the “optimal” bid is smaller for Reliant during Periods 2 and 3 than Period
1, with period 3’s variance being the smallest. These statistics indicate qualitatively
that Reliant is bidding better through time. For TXU, the absolute magnitude is
also drastically smaller during Period 2 and 3 than Period 1, showing a degree of
behavioral improvement.
b. Measurement of β2s
β2 can be measured day-by-day from equation (3.13) and in theory, β2 should equal
1. The measurement of β2 uses the intersection of the bid curve with the cost curve
(QCit,obs). The drawbacks of looking at this intersection point alone is that we ignore
the entire bid schedule. Each bid point informs us about the bidding strategy under
other possible realizations of residual demand. By looking only at the information
conveyed by the intersection point, we might ignore the optimality at other bid points.
Nevertheless this is an important piece of information. Table V gives the measurement
results. The consistency with Table 4 is that Reliant in the second period and TXU
in the last period shifted their bid curves too much that β2 is greater than one.
Again, starting from Period 2, both players are showing significant improvement in
the bidding strategy with regard to FTRs. The following histograms in Figure 2 and
Figure 3 give a clearer picture of the distribution of β2 over time. The histograms
reflect the overall precision of the β2 during each sample period.
The numbers and the histograms show that for both Reliant and TXU during
Period 2, the means of β2s are closer to 1 and the distributions have thinner tails.
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Table V. Test of Optimal Shifting – β2
(Feb 2002-May 2003, 18:00 - 18:15,freqoc > 0.5)
Period β2 s.d. min max obs.
Reliant
1 -.69 1.75 -3.31 2.50 23
2 1.25 1.71 -3.25 4.41 30
3 -.03 1.76 -3.46 3.31 17
TXU
1 -.57 2.47 -5.32 3.73 24
2 .75 1.16 -1.89 3.24 29
3 1.41 2.37 -2.46 6.93 17
Note: β2 is measured by QCit,obs = QCit,true − β2SP ′(pct )FTRit
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Fig. 2. Reliant β2 Histogram
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Fig. 3. TXU β2 Histogram
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Table VI. Estimation Results
(Feb. 2002-May 2003, LHS variable: pct − C ′(S(pct))
Period β1 s.e. β2 s.e. γ1 s.e. H0 H1 H2 H3 obs.
Reliant
1 .17 .13 .31 .28 .05 .08 R R R R 264
2 .10 .06 2.29* .51 .23 .18 R R A R 350
3 .82* .15 .34* .14 .28* .13 R R R A 80
TXU
1 .10* .03 -.46 .69 -.05 .06 R R R R 303
2 .14* .05 .57 .44 .08 .08 R R A R 343
3 1.01* .44 1.96* .32 1.99* .86 R R R A 86
Note: R stands for reject, A stands for accept; * indicates significant differently from zero at 5% significance level;
Hypothesis tests use 90% confidence interval; Standard errors are robust.
2. Estimation Results
Previous sections give qualitative measures of bidding optimality regarding FTRs.
This section quantitatively estimates FTRs’ impacts on bidding decisions. Rather
than looking at one point on the bid curve (such as the intersection point Qobs),
estimation equation (3.8) checks bid points on the entire bid schedule by allowing
residual demand to shift by random noises. Table VI reports the estimation results11.
For both firms, the perfect competitive and optimal strategic bidding test was
rejected. However, the equivalent treatment of net physical balancing market sales
and FTR “pseudo” capacity is not rejected in some periods and we see some learning
11In the estimations, due to possible stronger correlation within each bid curve, the
errors are robust to the extend that the intra-day correlations are corrected.
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pattern for the bidders.
Strategic Bidding on Inframarginal Capacity (β1) Neither firm shows optimal-
ity with regard to physical inframarginal capacity except in the last period –
Period 3. All the estimates for β1 are very significant for TXU. However for
Reliant, the β1 estimates are very noisy until Period 3. A learning pattern is
shown by the fact that β1 converges towards 1 for both firms through time.
Strategic Weights on FTRs (β2) Reliant significantly increased the weight on FTRs
during Period 2, but seems to revert to the bidding behavior with regard to
FTRs in period 1 during Period 3. The difference between Period 1 and Period
3 for Reliant is that in Period 3, the bidding strategies with regard to FTRs
becomes more consistent in Period 3 (the standard error is much smaller in
Period 3). TXU increased the weight on FTRs during Period 2, and continues
to internalize FTRs effects during Period 3. But obviously for TXU, the weight
being put on FTRs is greater than the optimal weight (β2 = 1) during Period
3. These estimates also explains our first qualitative measure of the distance
deviation from actual bid curve to the optimal bid curve: Since Reliant over-
weighted FTRs in its bidding during Period 2, it shifted the bid curve to the
left of the optimal bid curve, resulting in the distance being negative. Also due
to the over-weighting of FTRs during Period 3, TXU’s actual bids lie to the left
of optimal bids. These observations agree with each other: both Reliant and
TXU added weights to FTRs significantly more starting Period 2, but deviated
from optimal in Period 3. Based on our estimates from different perspectives,
the estimation results are fairly robust.
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3. Explanation of Results
The estimation results show that both firms began to strategically internalize FTRs
into their bidding decisions in Period 2. But some deviations from optimal behavior
require us to explore the data in more detail. I group the possible explanations
into two broad categories: 1), firms’ learning from the market, and 2), unit specific
characteristics that constraint or affect the optimization behavior.
a. Learning
The sample I study is the first one and a half years that FTRs are distributed to
the market participants. This time period also correspond to the beginning of the
second half of the first year that the Texas wholesale electricity market was opened.
The estimations show a significant trend of firms’ learning from the market: β1 is
significant and converging towards optimal bidding through time and β2 becomes
significant for both Periods 2 and 3. During the third sample period (Period 3),
both Reliant and TXU reached the optimal β1 as theory predicts. Statistical tests
for β2 show that FTRs are fully internalized into Reliant’s bidding strategies during
Period 2 (β1 = γ1). Although both Reliant and TXU showed deviation from optimal
internalization of FTRs during Period 3, FTRs’ effects are statistically significant in
their markup decision.
To give further evidence for firm’s learning behavior, there are other metrics that
reflect the increasing of sophistication of firms bidding strategies. In theory, a perfect
competitive firm should not consider demand elasticity and just bid according to its
generation units’ marginal costs. A more sophisticated bidder should bid reflecting
its beliefs of all possible realizations of residual demand in the market and the bid
points on a single bid schedule need not be a one-to-one correspondence to its power
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Table VII. Summary Statistics of Number of Bid Points on a Single Bid Schedule
(Feb 2002-May 2003,
18:00 - 18:15, all intervals)
Period mean s.d. min max
Reliant
1 18.25 5.85 8 28
2 18.09 1.78 12 22
3 12.03 2.27 6 22
TXU
1 12.81 4.69 8 24
2 12.88 1.81 7 20
3 14.29 2.86 8 30
plants. The more sophisticated the bidder is, the more bid points should be on a
single bid schedule to maximize the likelihood of profit maximization given possible
realizations of residual demand. I check how many bid points there are on a single
bid curve through time 12. Table VII gives the summary statistics of the number of
bid points on a single bid schedule.
For TXU at the mean, there’s an increasing trend for the number of bid points
on a single bid schedule. In Period 3, not only the mean is larger than Period 1, but
the distribution is tighter around the mean than Period 1. For Reliant at the mean,
the increase of the bid points is not significant. But for Period 2, although the mean
of bid points is less than that in Period 1, the distribution of the total number of bid
12ERCOT confine the maximum number of bid points to be 20 on the increasing
and decreasing bids respectively.
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points is much tighter around the mean during Period 2 than Period 1. However, in
Period 3, Reliant’s average bid points on a single bid schedule decreased significantly.
b. Unit Specifics
Unit specific characteristics will lead to constraints on the actual bids or marginal
cost curve. This section assesses those impacts on the optimal behavior.
One important unit specific characteristic is the ramp rate. Ramp rate indicates
the maximum speed at which a supplier can provide additional energy. For example,
if the market needs 100 MW of additional supply during a certain 15-minute interval
and a supplier informs ERCOT that it can provide 100 MW at a ramp rate of 10
MW per minute. Then the generator can provide 100 MW of its offer during the first
10-minute interval if the unit is called; but if the ramp rate is only 3 MW per minute,
it can only produce 45 MW during the entire 15-minute interval so that it cannot
meet the 100 MW need. The larger the ramp rate, the more flexible the unit is on
the real-time market. Based on the unit-specific ramp rates, ERCOT will invalidate
some bids due to the infeasibility caused by ramp rate constraints. After invalidating
some bids, ERCOT has to move to the next available higher bids, resulting in actual
market clearing prices being higher than my simulated prices. I do not observe those
invalidated bids on the bid curve. One metric that can be used to assess the degree of
bias in my estimation is the comparison between the simulated market clearing price
and the actual clearing price. The comparison in Table VIII gives a possible error
range as to how often the bids I observe are the actual bids used by ERCOT. The
error is large for TXU, almost 10%. Reliant is around 5%. I also list the comparison
during non-congestion intervals using the same market price simulation methods. It
is obvious that during congestion periods when the transmission lines are constrained,
the regional market is less flexible than the integrated ERCOT-wide market and hence
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Table VIII. Comparison of Actual Market Clearing Price and Simulated Market Clear-
ing Price
(Feb 2002-May 2003, 18:00 - 18:15)
Actual price Simulated price
Congestion intervals
Reliant 42.60 40.84
TXU 39.79 35.86
Non-congestion intervals
Reliant 26.45 26.48
TXU 26.45 26.43
Note: the congestion and non-congestion intervals are ex-post realizations.
the ramp rate constraints are more severe.
The above bias is between the observed bid stack and actual bid stack and the
bias is caused by all the firms on the market. To check the impact of this constraint
on Reliant and TXU’s cost side, I check for each firm their marginal units that have
lower than average ramp rate. Marginal units refer to those units that is most likely
to be called on the balancing market to increase or decrease production. For Reliant,
among the 5 marginal generation units in the Houston zone, 2 units have below
average ramp rates. For TXU, among the 4 marginal generation units in the North
zone, 1 unit has below average ramp rates. Overall, these units with low ramp rates
do not compose the majority of marginal unit and the constraints’ impact on the cost
side is minimum. Combine the above two factors, it is likely that the LHS is biased
downward with the possible bias range of 10% for TXU and 5% for Reliant. The
estimation coefficient is correspondingly biased downward within that range.
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c. Behavioral Stickiness
Hortac¸su & Puller (2004)’s study about bidders’ strategic behavior in year 2002 shows
that Reliant is bidding close to optimal and TXU is bidding higher than the optimal
bidding strategy. Although Hortac¸su & Puller (2004) do not calculate explicitly the
β1s, the implication from their paper is that Reliant’s β1 is close to 1 in year 2002
while TXU’s β1 is significantly higher than 1 in year 2002. These are different results
from this research, where both Reliant and TXU’s β1 are significantly lower than 1
in year 2002.
The sample in Hortac¸su & Puller (2004) is non-congestion hours while the sample
in this paper is most likely congestion hours (mostly are ex-post congestion hours).
The data shows significant bidders’ behavioral stickiness that attributes to the be-
havioral differences between the two researches. In non-congestion hours, the residual
demand is the system-wide residual demand that includes all four zones in the Texas
market. In congestion hours, however, the residual demand is only composed of zonal
residual demand because of the binding transmission constraints. Due to fewer play-
ers in the zonal market, the shape of the residual demand slope within each zone is
different from the aggregate residual demand – the potential to exercise market power
is greater in import-constrained zonal markets. However, the data show that although
the residual demand changes from system-wide market to zonal market, bidders’ bid
slopes are sticky from the earlier time period, in that in congestion hours, the bid
slopes do not rise in a manner that captures the potential to exercise market power in
an import-constrained market. Table IX is the comparison of the curvature changes
for residual demand and bids. The curvatures are slope estimates from simple least
square regressions between the price and quantity. I examine the residual demand
slope at different prices ranges serving to “magnify” the residual demand slope at
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Table IX. Comparison of Residual Demand Slope and Bid Slope Changes
Period RD250 RD100 RDall RD500 bid slope
1
Reliant 22.61 10.12 20.20 14.47 0.97
TXU 5.73 6.22 6.85 8.14 1.36
2
Reliant 11.21 10.11 12.60 9.93 1.02
TXU 6.78 7.17 6.66 9.07 1.38
specific price ranges. The statistics listed in the table for residual demand are the
ratios of zonal residual demand slope at time t to system-wide residual demand slope
at t-1. For example, “RD250” indicates the ratio of zonal residual demand slope at
time t to the aggregate residual demand slope at time t-1 within the price range of
$-250 to $+250. The statistics for the bid slopes are the ratio of zonal bid slope at
time t to the system-wide bid slope at time t-1. Time t is the ex-post congestion
hours at hour 18 while time t-1 is the ex-post non-congestion hours one day earlier
at hour 18.
The comparison shows that the zonal residual demand in an import-constrained
zonal market is much steeper than the aggregate residual demand in the common
market, but the bid slopes do not seem to change from the last time period, which
is what I refer to as “behavioral stickiness”. Based on those statistics, the reason
for the discrepancy of the β1 between this research and Hortac¸su & Puller (2004) is
due to the behavioral stickiness: the bidders did not increase their bid slopes enough
during the congested time periods to capture their increased market power reflected
in their steeper zonal residual demand.
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D. Counterfactual Studies
Based on structural estimation equation (3.6), I can construct counterfactual bid
curves assuming that firms are optimizing with FTRs in their bidding decisions to
study the “best/worst case” scenario. To study the effect of FTRs only, I keep the
original bid shape assuming that firms still make the same bidding decisions with
respect to their net physical balancing market sales, but I shift the bid curves so that
the “weight” being put on FTRs is 1. The counterfactual optimal bid curves further
allow me to calculate the optimal allocation of the FTRs. I can then compare the
current allocation with the optimal ones to detect the efficiency effect of the current
allocation of FTRs.
1. Price and Cost Effect
By intersecting the counterfactual bids with the realized residual demand, I am able
to find the counterfactual market clearing points and the corresponding marginal pro-
duction costs. Table X and Table XI show the comparison of price and cost under
current allocation of FTRs and also the counterfactual scenario when there are no
FTRs owned. Since Reliant and TXU are major players in their own regional mar-
ket, the statistics are reflective of the overall market in the following two ways: first,
the market clearing price constructed for Reliant and TXU should also be the zonal
market clearing price, and second, since TXU and Reliant are major suppliers and
also marginal on the balancing market, their marginal cost should roughly reflect the
overall market’s marginal production cost.
By fully internalizing FTRs, the market clearing prices are strictly higher
than without the ownership of FTRs based on the ex-post realized residual demand.
The comparison for market marginal production costs under counterfactual scenarios
47
Table X. Comparison Between Counterfactual Market Clearing Prices
Reliant (Houston) TXU (North)
Month p∗ p∗noFTR p
∗ p∗noFTR
2002 Feb 14.6 9.5 20.54 19.75
Mar 30.5 18 59.00 40
Apr 51.25 40.1 38.62 30.50
May 43.94 43.67 33 33
June 26.37 23.02 32.98 25.74
July 25.76 22.88 28.35 18.99
Aug 32.22 27.97 34.13 25.24
Sept 49.10 20.81 34.87 23.28
Oct 69.65 41 37.88 25.88
2003 Jan 67.50 35 20.75 10.5
Mar 107.14 32.67 39.95 30.50
Apr 53.01 34.94 26.08 19.04
May 166.00 151.5 195.68 132.62
Note: p∗ is the market clearing price when current ownership of FTRs are fully internalized into firm’s bidding;
p∗noFTR is the market clearing price when no FTRs are owned by the firms.
48
shows that the ownership of FTRs leads to lower marginal production costs, but such
changes are not significant compared to price changes. Most of FTRs’ impacts on the
bidding is reflected by higher market clearing prices in the counterfactual scenarios.
For some months, the average market clearing prices are lower than the average
marginal cost, meaning that the firm is mostly cleared on the market as a net buyer.
For a net buyer, FTRs erodes its monopsony power and can lead to an improvement
in the price signal efficiency. The next section explores the price signal improvement
by the ownership of FTRs and hence an optimal allocation of FTRs.
2. Optimal Allocations of FTRs.
An important policy question is: how many FTRs should be assigned to the ma-
jor firms with market power. If we regard FTRs as a form of contract, then their
assignment can be used to optimize the contract quantity that enters the balancing
market. Such an optimality can be achieved through forcing the intersection of bids
and marginal cost curve (the combined effect of true net contract position and FTRs)
as close to the market clearing point for the firm as possible. The market-clearing
price could then be closely reflective of marginal production cost. If the firm is cleared
as a net seller, then no FTRs would be optimal since any FTRs on the increasing
supply side would cause “QCobs” to be smaller and a firm’s market power on the
balancing market would be higher due to greater capacity flexibility. However, if the
firm is cleared as a net buyer, then increasing the ownership of FTRs essentially de-
creases the firm’s available decreasing capacity and hence erode its monopsony power.
Figure 4 illustrates the price efficiency gain when a market participant is a net buyer
in the balancing market. For this counterfactual study, I assume that firms fully
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Table XI. Comparison Between Counterfactual Marginal Production Costs
Reliant (Houston) TXU (North)
Month c∗ c∗noFTR c
∗ c∗noFTR
2002 Feb 18.08 19.37 21.57 21.70
Mar 28.08 28.08 24.30 24.30
Apr 32.84 32.84 37.51 38.37
May 34.66 34.66 35.10 35.10
June 35.98 36.41 36.58 37.53
July 32.89 32.94 33.53 36.41
Aug 31.99 32.16 37.09 37.87
Sept 32.96 35.70 39.13 39.79
Oct 43.18 44.07 39.53 41.00
2003 Jan 16.59 17.12 52.13 52.34
Mar 44.39 60.84 27.12 27.32
Apr 49.12 50.90 25.90 32.52
May 56.05 56.44 62.79 63.54
Note: c∗ is the marginal cost when current ownership of FTRs are fully internalized into firm’s bidding; c∗noFTR is
the marginal cost when no FTRs are owned by the firms.
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Fig. 4. Optimal FTRs – Erode Monopsony Power
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internalize FTRs into their bidding by letting β2 = 1
13. I search on the entire range
of FTRs with a grid of 20 FTRs14. For each level of FTRs, I calculate the markups
using the ex-post realized residual demand. Then the daily markups are averaged
to the monthly level. The optimal assignment of FTRs should result in the smallest
monthly average markup to effectively curbing market power.
For Reliant in the Houston zone, only the South-to-Houston FTRs are involved.
For TXU in the North zone, there are two types of FTRs involved: South-to-North
FTRs and West-to-North FTRs. Since there are no good rules of weights to be put on
each FTR, I only consider the optimal allocation of South-to-North FTRs 15. Table
XII lists the comparison of optimal assignment of FTRs and the actual assignment
of FTRs. Due to confidentiality, these numbers are inflated but the orders are kept
the same.
Based on ex-post realization of residual demand, the optimal allocation of FTRs
in most months differ greatly from the actual allocations. Table XIII reports the av-
erage markups under optimal, actual and no allocations of FTRs.
Using ex-post realizations of residual demands, we see that the optimal alloca-
tion of FTRs lead to market price efficiency in terms of lowering firms mark down
abilities. Also the comparisons show that under current allocations, however, there
are months that the market price signal is less accurate than without the ownership
of FTRs.
13From my estimation results, we notice that firms are doing better through time,
or they are more aware of FTRs when congestion is more often. The only relevant
parameter for β2 in the counterfactual study is the optimal level since this is the only
equilibrium point that’s stable in a firm’s best response.
14Since the total FTRs are on a magnitude of over 400 each month, I regard the
grid of being 20 as fine enough.
15TXU also owns generation in the West zone so that the West-to-North FTRs are
internal to TXU (TXU cannot control price in the South zone but it can in the West
zone).
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Table XII. Optimal Assignment of FTRs
month Reliant TXU
optimal actual optimal actual
2002 Feb 460 488.5 190 242.5
Mar 340 361 370 538
Apr 580 328 670 454
May 190 361 160 454
June 430 361 460 454
July 580 391 190 454
Aug 1180 328 580 454
Sept 670 328 700 529
Oct 250 328 190 454
2004 Jan 100 205 460 398.27
Mar 100 205 610 285.59
Apr 130 205 370 285.59
May 370 205 100 285.59
Note: numbers in bold represent large differences between optimal allocations and actual allocations in the
magnitude of greater than 100 FTRs.
53
Table XIII. Markups Under Optimal, Actual and No Assignment of FTRs
month Reliant TXU
optimal actual no FTRs optimal actual no FTRs
2002 Feb 3.38 4.89 5.08 6.43 7.04 7.71
Mar 0 4.57 6.43 15.85 34.70 15.70
Apr 9.88 20.08 22.02 22.89 25.53 34.51
May 9.61 10.12 9.75 73.81 75.15 73.81
June 9.93 13.51 17.39 12.58 15.47 16.61
July 8.33 10.07 13.58 14.93 23.63 16.96
Aug 1.65 5.62 7.74 2.45 6.44 11.87
Sept 6.94 36.7 24.68 4.47 10.18 20.34
Oct 6.97 28.12 7.66 4.94 6.93 15.13
2004 Jan 20.90 50.91 17.88 16.54 31.59 20.34
Mar 69.58 79.51 69.58 14.99 17.35 17.2
Apr 22.57 30.53 28.2 4.83 7.13 18.58
May 121.61 132.53 147.48 84.26 134.91 84.26
Note: Numbers in bold indicate that under the current allocations of FTRs, the market price efficiency is adversely
impacted by FTRs comparing to no ownership of FTRs; residual demand is the ex-post realization.
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The tables report the results under the ex-post realization of FTRs. If demand is
uncertain, then it is the average effect of FTRs under all possible demand realizations
that matters. By considering demand uncertainty, I can also statistically compare the
actual allocations of FTRs with the optimal ones. To assess demand uncertainty, I
constructed two metrics: 1) daily demand variation and, 2) weekly demand variation.
The first is constructed using standard deviations of demand levels in a single day
from 1pm to 8pm. The second metric is constructed using standard deviations of de-
mand levels for the interval 18:00-18:15 only within the same week. All the demand
variations are then averaged to a monthly level. The demand uncertainty (standard
deviation) is in the range of 250 MW daily and 400 MW weekly for both North
and Houston zones. To allow demand uncertainty to be within a larger range, I use
randomly generated numbers from a normal distribution with weekly demand varia-
tion16. I generate demand uncertainty 100 times for each time period. I report the
mean, the 5% percentile, the median and the 95% percentile for the monthly distribu-
tion of markup differences (|markupit,actual| − |markupit,opt|) between the ownership
of optimal level of FTRs and the actual level under possible realizations of residual
demands, see Table XIV.
The improvements are determined looking at the mean and the median17. If
both the mean and the median is strictly positive – meaning that the markup under
actual allocation is greater than under the optimal allocation – then the optimal allo-
cation improves price signal efficiency in the wholesale market. Considering demand
uncertainty, the improvement by optimal allocations of FTRs is limited. For Reliant,
16I also used random draws from a normal distribution with daily demand variation.
The results are quite similar.
17In case of extreme distributions, the median is a better statistics than the mean
in explaining the average.
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Table XIV. Statistics for Markup Difference:|markupactual| − |markupopt|
month Reliant TXU
mean 5% median 95% mean 5% median 95%
2002 Feb .24 -1.07 0 2.93 -.06 -8 0 8.24
Mar -.17 -3.22 0 2 43.75 -12 32.71 54.08
Apr 19.02 -17.42 0 29 6.14 -19.09 0.51 33.93
May 1.22 -1.78 0 7.5 0 -16.62 0 2.47
Jun .65 -7.68 0 10.75 2.02 -11.69 0 12.39
Jul 1.14 -22.54 1 13 2.5 -6.18 0 20
Aug 1.67 -22.57 2.52 23.44 -3.49 -18.68 1.75 12.12
Sept -2.21 -254.82 2.11 252.73 5.39 -17.16 1.71 25.86
Oct 13.66 -5.33 5 50 -0.61 -11 0 4.11
Jan 24.46 -0.2 5.01 199 20.6 -12.01 18.41 38.59
Mar 14.48 -54.83 -1.18 199 2.08 -91.81 -1.02 16.79
Apr -.55 -29.99 -4.03 104 0.06 -2.01 0 10
May 2.66 -99 0 31.3 98.31 -8.32 0 223.02
Note: Numbers in bold indicate improvement by optimal allocations of FTRs – both at the mean and at the
median, the absolute magnitude of markup under actual ownership of FTRs is larger than under the optimal
ownership of FTRs.
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the improvements from actual allocations can only be made at July, August, October
in 2002 and January in 2003. For TXU, the improvements from actual allocations
can only be made at March, April, September in 2002 and January in 2003. In most
months, the actual allocations of FTRs are statistically equivalent to optimal ones.
An immediate question is that whether we should assign FTRs to market partic-
ipants when demand is uncertain. Table XV lists the markup differences under the
optimal allocations of FTRs and no ownership of FTRs.
Only when both the mean and the median are strictly negative that I regard
the optimal allocations of FTRs as having an improvement on the price efficiency.
For both Reliant and TXU, 7 out of 13 months in the study has a significant improve-
ment by the optimal allocations of FTRs under uncertain demand. This counterfac-
tual study indicates that if FTRs are allocated optimally and players fully internalize
FTRs into their bidding, the market has an efficiency improvement in the spot market
price signal.
Since this counterfactual study only involves the optimal allocation of FTRs and
not the designing of FTR auction, the numbers in Table XI indicate that if any firm
wish to own FTRs and the FTRs are assigned by the grid operator, then the grid
operator can optimize in the assignment FTRs. Another direction of research is to give
a firm incentive to acquire not only the individually optimal amount of FTRs but also
the socially optimal (or sub-optimal) amount of FTRs from the FTR auction. Similar
literature can be found in the designing of contract where information is asymmetric.
But this auction mechanism design is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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Table XV. Statistics for Markup Difference:|markupopt| − |markupnoFTR|
month Reliant TXU
mean 5% median 95% mean 5% median 95%
2002 Feb -1.62 -10.42 -1 4 -.58 -10.5 0 9.01
Mar -3.12 -10.03 -4 2.23 2.24 -32.7 -0.01 35.07
Apr -29.34 -20 0 18.21 -9.84 -34.25 -12.56 11
May 2.69 -0.96 0 17.31 1.17 0 0 10
Jun -11.02 -27.49 -1.13 14.31 -3.21 -23.5 -3.16 16
Jul -29.90 -27.96 -4.23 22.3 1.88 -23.3 0 18.8
Aug -5.62 -28.78 -5.75 21.44 -1.12 -14 -6.06 16.49
Sept -2.24 -205 -7.54 249.3 -8.69 -33.72 -11.03 12.4
Oct 17.63 -14.38 3.76 95 -6.13 -12.63 -9.04 7.95
Jan -6.42 -7.81 -5.01 1.05 -55.81 -618.72 -30.27 30.29
Mar 0 0 0 0 13.70 -22.56 0 83.99
Apr -4.56 -22.11 0 25.81 -3.13 -28.57 -2.8 30.55
May 34.70 -51.88 -13.77 224 0 0 0 0
Note: Numbers in bold indicate improvement by optimal allocations of FTRs – both at the mean and at the median,
the absolute magnitude of markup under optimal ownership of FTRs is smaller than under no ownership of FTRs.
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CHAPTER IV
FTR AUCTIONS
A. Theories
This section derives value functions for different types of bidders in the FTR auction.
Then equilibrium bidding strategies are presented. The equilibrium bidding strategies
include not only the independent private value (IPV) case, but also the affiliated
valuation (AV) case.
The time line for the entire games is: first participants purchase FTRs in the
FTR auction, then use FTRs on the wholesale market. In this chapter, I call the
wholesale market competition as the second stage game and the FTR auction itself
as the first stage game. In the following subsections, I first study the wholesale market
competition to derive the marginal valuation of FTRs for different types of bidders.
Then given those valuations, I derive equilibrium bidding in the FTR auctions.
1. Generator’s Valuation of FTRs
At the second stage, with the ownership of a certain amount of FTRs that’s awarded
from the FTR auctions, the generators bid into the energy market to supply electricity
as was described in the previous chapter. In all the following analysis, I assume that
the bidders are competing in a Cournot Nash-in-quantity game 1 on the wholesale
electricity market, and that there are no dynamics of the game (that players are not
1In an ideal set up, the strategy should follow a supply function equilibrium game
where the choice variable is not a single quantity point q, but rather a supply function
S(p). However, in most cases, it is not possible to derive an analytical closed form
solution to the supply function equilibrium unless we impose some functional form
restrictions on the supply function. For ease of illustration, I use the Cournot game in
this theory section without loss of the essence of the important aspects of the results.
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colluding). The first two sub-sections are valuation analysis for generators. The third
sub-section discusses a trader’s valuation.
a. Risk Neutral Bidders
First for simplicity, I assume that bidders are risk neutral, in that their utility func-
tions are linear in their profit2. My following analysis focuses on the bidders in the
import-constrained market. We only need to reverse the signs for the cases of export-
constrained bidders without any complexity. For a bidder in an import-constrained
market, her profit on the wholesale market is given by:
piit = PM,tqit − Cit(qit) + (PM,t − PX,t)kit (4.1)
Where PM,t is the spot price in the import-constrained region at time t, PX,t is the
spot price in the export-constrained region at time t. Cit is the generator’s cost at
time t when supplying qit quantity of electricity. kit is the number of FTRs the
generator has at time t. In the above profit function, the only variables that are
exogenous to the firms at this stage are PX,t and kit
3 if the firm only has generation
in the import-constrained region. The first term in the profit function is the revenue
from sales on the spot market, the second term is the production cost and the last
term is the FTR revenue4. By assumptions, in a Cournot game the generator chooses
qit to maximize profit. The following example shows how the number of FTRs plays
a role in the profit maximization problem.
2The assumption of risk neutral is not convincing for generators who wish to
purchase FTRs. The purpose of this section is to illustrate major components in
the value structure from the easiest case and I will relax this assumption in the next
subsection.
3The number of FTRs is pre-determined in the first stage game.
4For detailed discussion of FTR revenue, please refer to Chapter III theory section.
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Suppose that there are n symmetric generators in the import-constrained region,
the demand function is linear: PM,t = 1 − (Qt +Kt). Qt indicates the total energy
supplied in that region and Kt is the total amount of imports, which at the time of
congestion is the maximum transmission line capacity. Suppose that each generator’s
cost function is linear in output: Cit = citqit, then using equation (4.1), we can get
the equilibrium Cournot quantities and prices as being:
qit =
1
n+1
(1−Kt +∑j 6=i cjt +∑j 6=i kjt − n(kit + cit))
PM,t =
1
n+1
(1−Kt +∑j 6=i kjt + kit +∑i cit)
Qt =
1
n+1
(n− nKt −∑j 6=i kjt − kit −∑i cit)
The above equilibrium solutions show that the output is partially decided by the
number of FTRs that’s given to the firm exogenously at the second stage. As I have
shown in the previous chapter that by studying bidder’s bid schedules on this second
stage, I find that FTRs have strategic effects on bidders’ bidding strategy on the
wholesale electricity market. The above solutions are examples that FTRs will enter
the decision of the choice variables in the second stage electricity supply.
More interestingly, if we put those equilibrium solutions back into the profit
function of the individual player as a function of the FTRs, we will get a profit
function that only consists of the number of FTRs and the total line capacity – which
are exogenous to the firm on that stage. Taking derivative with respect to the number
of FTRs, we get the “marginal valuation of FTR” as:
∂piit
∂kit
= Vkit = (PM.t − PX,t) +
1
n+ 1
(qit + kit) + (− n
n+ 1
)(PM,t − cit) (4.2)
The first term is the per unit FTR credit5; the second term is the marginal profit
5Description about unit FTR credit can be found in Chapter III.
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increase due to the importer’s ability to increase price by the ownership of FTRs,
the third term is the marginal profit decrease due to the withholding of supply. The
economic intuition underlying the above equation is quite clear: the valuation of FTRs
for the importer is not only decided by the unit FTR credit, but is also affected by
the marginal profit change due to FTRs’ impacts on market power.
The above solution is specific to our assumptions of cost function and market de-
mand function. In the real world, the market demand function might not be strictly
linear as it is in the example, and the cost functions vary among market participants.
Further, when the market demand and cost functions become more complex for mar-
ket participants, we will have difficulty deriving analytically the market equilibrium.
However based on the above intuition, we can write the FTR value function for the
individual player as:
Vkit = (PM.t − PX,t) +
∂PM,t
∂kit
(qit + kit) +
∂qit
∂kit
(PM,t − C ′it) (4.3)
Since the valuations are decided ex-ante before the real-time competition, the valua-
tions should be made with expectations. We can re-write our valuation in an ex-ante
format as:
Vkit = E(PM.t − PX,t) + E(
∂PM,t
∂kit
(qit + kit)) + E(
∂qit
∂kit
(PM,t − C ′it)) (4.4)
where E(·) represents expectations. The first term is FTRs’ contribution to the
marginal revenue of FTR credits – the unit FTR credit, the second and the third
term are FTRs’ contribution to additional profit change due to the affected market
power on the wholesale market.
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b. Risk Averse Bidders
Part of the reason for designing FTRs is to provide market participants with some
hedging instruments against the volatile transmission cost. A more reasonable set
up is to model bidders as being risk averse. Suppose that a risk averse firm has the
following utility function6:
U(p˜iit) = −e−γp˜iit (4.5)
With the profit p˜iit defined the same way as was in equation (4.1) except that the
profit is now uncertain which is denoted by a tilde. γ is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient
of absolute risk aversion. The higher the γ, the more risk averse the bidder is. The
bidder maximizes on her expected utility which is E(U(p˜iit)). When the noises are
distributed normal, the expected utility can be re-written as:
E(−e−rp˜i) = −e−r(E(p˜i)− γ2 var(p˜i)) (4.6)
And the certainty equivalent CE(p˜i) of the random p˜i is equal to E(p˜i) − γ
2
var(p˜i).
Since the utility function is an increasing function in the certainty equivalent, we can
focus only on CE(p˜i) alone without any loss of the analysis.
Following the same logic from the last sub-section, we need to find out the
marginal valuation of FTRs when bidders are risk averse. As is shown in the earlier
example, in equilibrium, the equilibrium prices and quantities are all functions of
FTRs, i.e. PM,t = PM,t(kit) and qit = qit(kit), then the marginal valuation of FTRs
are decided by:
∂CE(p˜i)
∂kit
= Vkit = E((PM,t − PX,t))
+E(
∂PM,t
∂kit
(qit + kit)) + E(
∂qit
∂kit
(PM,t − C ′it))−
γ
2
· ∂V ar(p˜i)
∂kit
(4.7)
6In this chapter I assume that the bidder’s risk aversion is CARA (Constant Ab-
solute Risk Aversion).
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Different from previous risk neutral case, a risk averse bidder is willing to pay risk
premiums if FTRs can decrease their profit volatility (∂V ar(p˜i)
∂kit
≤ 0).
2. Trader’s Valuation of FTRs
Traders are defined as those entities that neither represent generation side nor repre-
sent consumer service side. They enter this market to maximize their profits through
various means of arbitrage behaviors. Since FTRs are purely financial in nature,
traders can buy FTRs to obtain arbitrage revenue through the differences between
FTR auction payments and ex-post FTR credits. Traders can also sell FTRs on the
secondary market. We can write a trader’s profit on the wholesale market as:
pitraderit = piwholesale trading,it + (PM,t − PX,t)kit (4.8)
The first term is the profit the trader get from trading on the wholesale market and
the second term is the FTR revenue. Notice that both the PM,t and the PX,t are not
functions of kit: The trader cannot participant in the real-time market so that it does
not have any influence on the wholesale market price7. Given the profit function and
if we regard traders as being risk neutral, by taking derivative of the profit function
with respect to the amount of FTRs, their true valuations for FTRs are the future
expected unit FTR credit. In its simplest form, the unit FTR credit is the price spread
between two markets with different prices separated by a constrained transmission
7There can be arguments that the amount of FTRs a trader own would affect the
leftover amount of FTRs that generators would own, so that traders can indirectly
affect the wholesale market price. But the set up here on the second stage is for
the FTRs that’s already awarded. Given that a trader hold kit amount of FTRs, it
cannot affect the real-time market price but it can make forecasts of the difference
between PM,t and PX,t. The reason apply the same way in our later study of bidding
equilibrium: given a certain amount of FTRs the trader would bid, the trader can
make forecast of the future market price spread based on the leftover amount that
the generators would own, but it cannot affect the future market price spread given
the amount of FTRs already owned.
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interface. Written in the ex-ante form, we have:
Vit = E(PM,t − PX,t) (4.9)
However, if the traders’ purpose of purchasing FTRs is also to hedge against the
volatility of congestion cost incurred in the second stage game, a trader should also
be risk averse. In the same logic as the analysis for the generators, the traders’
marginal valuation of FTRs can also include the risk premium that a trader is willing
to pay to reduce the volatility in the transaction, and can be written down as:
Vit = E(PM,t − PX,t)− δ
2
· ∂V ar(p˜i
trader
it )
∂kit
(4.10)
In the following analysis for traders, I will use equation (4.10).
3. Equilibrium Bidding
Our previous section derives different value functions. In the bidding for FTRs,
auction theory implies that the bidders should shade their bids below their true value
in the uniform-price auction. The below analysis gives equilibrium bidding strategies
in the FTR auction given that the valuation of FTRs are privately known for each
bidders. Their valuations are denoted as Vit, keeping in mind that different bidders
have different Vit. The following analysis again adopt notations from Wilson (1979)
where he collapses all the uncertainties in the multi-unit auction into the uncertainty
of market clearing prices, and is denoted by the “H(·)” function.
Generally, the bidder in the FTR auction tries to maximize the following expected
utility conditional on her own private signal:
Uit = E(Vkit − p(kit)|si) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ k(p)
0
[Es−i|p,si(Vkit)− k−1(kit)]dkdH(p, kit(p, si))
(4.11)
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where si denote the signals that bidder i has. k
−1(kit) is the inverse function of the
bids where kit = k(pit). H(p, k(p, si)) is the probability of the market clearing price
being p:
H(p, kit(p, sit)) = Prob(kit(p, sit) ≤ K −∑Nj 6=i kjt(p, sjt)) = Prob(pc ≤ p|kit(p, sit))
The above model does not make any explicit restriction on whether the valuation is
independent or affiliated, neither does it put on any restrictions as to whether the
bidders are ex-ante symmetric or asymmetric. The above model is also general in
terms of the auction format – can be applied to both discriminatory- and uniform-
price auction. However, different assumptions would make our model predictions
being different, which are shown in the following subsections.
a. An Independent Private Value (IPV) Uniform-Price Auction Model
Let us first consider an independent private value case. When the values are assumed
to be independent, we are saying that the loser will not envy the winner, in that there
is no common value component in the goods being auctioned. Put in the context of
the FTR auction, an independent private value indicates that bidders value FTRs
differently due to their differences in market power. As we have seen in the theory
section, when the player has market power different from her rivals and can use the
FTRs strategically to manipulate the wholesale market clearing price, the privately
expected market power effect will be different for different players.
After we made those assumptions, equation (4.11) can be reduced to:
Uit =
∫ ∞
0
([
∫ k(pc)
0
V (kit(p), si)dk]− k(p)p)dH(pc, k(pc, si)) (4.12)
A major distinction from equation (4.11) is that the bidder’s own signal does not
depend on other player’s signal, but only on its own.
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Using the variation approach, we get the necessary condition for maximizing the
above utility function8:
V (kit(p), si) = pit + kit
−Hk
Hp
(4.13)
This Euler equation shows that valuation is shaded by a factor kit
−Hk
Hp
. Hk is the
change in the probability of there being excess supply when the bidder submits an-
other quantity, holding bid price being fixed. The intuition is that the higher quantity
the bidder request the amount to be awarded at a given price, the lower the proba-
bility that the quantity is inframarginal, and hence the lower the probability of there
being excess supply: so Hk is negative. Hp is the change in the probability of the
bid price being higher than the market clearing price when the bidder bids another
price, holding the bid quantity being fixed. Since the bid quantity is fixed, the higher
the price that the bidder is willing to pay, the higher the probability that the price is
higher than the market clearing price: so Hp is positive. Then the entire term k
−Hk
Hp
is positive, which is the bid shading amount.
Intuitively, the bid shading in the multi-unit uniform price auction is similar
to demand reduction for a monopsony buyer. The greater the quantity the buyer
demands, the lower the price the monopsony would pay by exercising its monopsony
market power. In the case of multiple unit demand auction, the buyers are able to
shade their bids in a similar way to extract surplus from the auction. The greater the
quantity they demand, the greater they can shade (or the lower they would bid) from
their marginal valuation of the goods since the marginal price they pay applies to all
inframarginal quantities awarded in a uniform price auction. In this sense, when we
say that a bidder has market power, we are essentially saying that the bidder is able
to shade her bids from her own marginal valuation of the good.
8Detailed derivation can be found in the appendix
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b. An Affiliated Value (AV) Uniform-Price Auction Model
This subsection discusses the case where the valuations have a common value com-
ponent, in other words, the bidder’s valuation is affiliated with the other bidders’
valuation. In this case, we cannot say that the loser will not envy the winner since
there is a common component in their valuation. In the case of FTR auction, the
common value might be the expected unit FTR credit.
Given the above intuitions, and suppose that the bidders’ valuation are affiliated
through the “shadow price” of FTRs that partially decides the FTR valuation, then
we can reduce equation (4.11) to:
Uit =
∫ ∞
0
[
∫ k(pc)
0
V (kit(p), si, p)dk]− k(p)pdH(pc, k(pc, si) (4.14)
The only difference in the above equation is that valuation is now affiliated through
a common factor p, or the market clearing price, which is partially reflective of the
possible ex-post unit FTR credit.
Using variation approach, we can get the necessary condition as:
V (kit(p), si, p) = pit + kit
−Hk
Hp
+
Hk
Hp
∫ k(pc)
0
∂V (kit(p), si, p)
∂p
dk (4.15)
In addition to the RHS of the necessary condition for IPV model, there’s an extra
term Hk
Hp
∫ k(pc)
0
∂V (kit(p),si,p)
∂p
dk which makes the bid shading decisions being different
from the IPV model. If we assume that in the independent private value case, the
individual valuation is purely dependent on the bidder’s own signal sit, we can write
the value function as a function of sit only
9. According to equation (4.15), the last
term should be zero because there’s no common component p in it. If the valuation
9In our earlier sections, the sit can be regarded as the individual market power,
based on the individual market power, the bidder can make future price difference
predictions and so forth.
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is affiliated among each other, and the auction clearing price is an indication of the
common value, then we can write down the value function as a function of both sit
and pt and the last term for value affiliation will appear.
The additional value shading has two implications: First, due to the common
value existence, “winner’s curse” arises. Different from IPV, where a winner should
not worry about whether her own valuation is too high upon winning, in an affiliated
value auction, the winner is worried about valuating the object higher than the actual
value and the additional value shading captures the avoidance of the “winner’s curse”
effect. In addition to the original shading in the IPV case, the bidder wishes to shade
even lower to avoid the “winner’s curse”. Second, in the presence of a common value,
the larger the variance in the supported uncertainty distribution, the more the bidder
is willing to shade. For example, if a bidder knows for certain that a certain quantity
is worth $5, it might bid $4 if the optimal shading is $1 in an affiliated value auction;
but if the value can go up or down around the mean of $5 with 20%, then the bidder
is not willing to bid $4, rather she would bid some amount less than $4 because of
the “winner’s curse” problem – she is more uncertain of the common value and will
worry whether her draw from the uncertainty distribution is too high. In an IPV
case, however, even if the uncertainty goes up, the bidder can still bid $4 because her
mean valuation is $5, independent of how the other bidder would value the object.
Notice that the above analysis for IPV and AV bidding strategy carries through
with a risk averse bidder, as is proved in Appendix D for multi-unit auctions.
B. Theory Implications
In this section I derive equilibrium bidding models in the FTR auction and give theory
implications for empirical testing of bidding strategies in the auction for FTRs.
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1. IPV Case
For generators, their full model of bidding is the following:
V (kit(p), si) = p
g
it + kit
−Hk
Hp
⇒
E((PM.t−PX,t))+E(∂PM,t
∂kit
(qit+kit))+E(
∂qit
∂kit
(PM,t−C ′it))−
γ
2
·∂V ar(p˜i)
∂kit
= pgit+kit
−Hk
Hp
(4.16)
for traders, their full model of bidding is the following:
V (kit(p), si) = p
t
it + kit
−Hk
Hp
⇒
E((PM.t − PX,t))− δ
2
· ∂V ar(p˜i)
∂kit
= ptit + kit
−Hk
Hp
(4.17)
2. AV Case
For generators, their full model of bidding is the following:
Vit = p
g
it + kit
−Hk
Hp
+ Hk
Hp
∫ k(pc)
0
∂V (kit(p),si,p)
∂p
dk
⇒
E((PM.t − PX,t)) + E(∂PM,t∂kit (qit + kit)) + E(
∂qit
∂kit
(PM,t − C ′it))− γ2 · ∂V ar(p˜i)∂kit
= pgit + kit
−Hk
Hp
+
Hk
Hp
∫ k(pc)
0
∂V (kit(p), si, p)
∂p
dk (4.18)
for traders, their full model of bidding is the following:
V (kit(p), si) = p
t
it + kit
−Hk
Hp
+ Hk
Hp
∫ k(pc)
0
∂V (kit(p),si,p)
∂p
dk
⇒
E((PM.t − PX,t))− δ2 · ∂V ar(p˜i)∂kit
= ptit + kit
−Hk
Hp
+
Hk
Hp
∫ k(pc)
0
∂V (kit(p), si, p)
∂p
dk (4.19)
70
3. Empirical Predictions
The models yield testable predictions about bidding behaviors for generators and
traders:
1. The bidders’ bids are positively correlated with expected FTR shadow price.
Ideally, the correlation should be one.
2. A generator with market power should take into account FTRs’ effect on the ex-
ercising of market power. However, the effect can be both positive and negative
depending on the market demand functions and firm’s cost functions10.
3. A bidder is willing to pay risk premiums if she is risk averse. However, in an
affiliated value model, since the higher the variation in the value of the FTR
credit, the more the bidder is willing to shade or pay less. Then the combined
effect of the uncertainty is ambiguous. If we get a positive effect regarding
the uncertainty payment, we cannot separate out the risk premium from the
bid shading; if we get a negative effect regarding the uncertainty payment, we
can conclude with confidence that valuations are affiliated and the bid shading
dominates the risk premium payment.
10In equation (4.7), the market power effect is the combination of the second and
third term. Although we can predict the sign for the second and third term, the
combined effect is ambiguous.
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C. Empirical Models
1. Model of Trader’s Bidding
The empirical model of traders’ bidding is the following11:
pjt = β1E(SP )jt + β2E(var)jt + β3FTRjt + β4 + β5annual + ζj + jt (4.20)
The LHS is the bid price for FTRs. The first term on the RHS is the expected unit
FTR credit – the shadow price (SP) of the transmission line; the second term is the
volatility of congestion cost approximated by the variance of the unit FTR credit;
FTR is the amount of FTRs the bidder wishes to purchase corresponding to that
price bid – this term is supposed to pick up the bid shading amount that’s existent
in both the IPV case and in the AV case. “annual” is a dummy controlling for the
fact that the auction is annual auction. Since the annual auction auctions off 60%
of the total FTRs, I put a dummy here to capture any unobserved effects that I did
not measure for the annual auction. ζj is the different FTR specific type effect, jt is
assumed to be i.i.d. random errors. The coefficients convey the following implications:
• β1: According to theory, equilibrium bidding implies β1 = 1
• β2: This term reflects the combination of the bidders’ risk premium payment
and the bid shading due to uncertainty. The sign of the coefficient is ambiguous
depending on which term dominates.
• β3: This term reflects the bid shading component corresponding to each FTR
amount bid. This coefficient is predicted to be negative.
11Since there is only one trader in the FTR auction in Texas, there is no need for
trader specific fixed effects.
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2. Model of Generator’s Bidding
Based on (4.18), we can test whether the ex-post market power effect is significant in
the generators’ bidding strategy. The simplest empirical model is:
pijt = β1E(SP )jt + β2E(var)jt + β3E(Market Power)ijt + β4FTRijt + β5 + ζj + jt
(4.21)
Our earlier models are based on the assumption that the generators only own gen-
eration in one regional market. In my data, however, there are generators who own
generation in multiple regions. We need to modify our model in the following ways:
• Generation locates in regions with the same direction of flow constraints.
If a generator has generation in market A and market B all import-constrained,
then we can write the profit function as12:
piit = PMA,tqA,it + PMB,tqB,it − CA,it(qA,it)− CB,it(qB,it)
+(PMA,t − PX,t)kA,it + (PMB,t − PX,t)kB,it (4.22)
Solving for optimal output choices qA,it and qB,it, they are functions of their
own regional FTRs, i.e. qA,it = qA,it(kA,it) and qB,it = qB,it(kB,it). The optimal
bidding solution is the same as in earlier models.
• Generation locates in regions with different direction of flow constraints.
Suppose these two regions A and B are adjacent and the power flow is from B
to A, then the profit function can be re-written as:
piit = PMA,tqA,it+PXB,tqB,it−CA,it(qA,it)−CB,it(qB,it)+(PMA,t−PXB,t)kit (4.23)
12In the profit function, I assume that the cost is additively separable in different
regions.
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Now the optimal solution of qA,it and qB,it are both functions of kit. Deriving
the marginal valuation of FTRs, we have:
Vit =
∂piit
∂kit
= (PMA,t − PXB,t) + ∂PMA,t∂kit (qA,it + kit) +
∂PXB,t
∂kit
(qB,it + kit)
+
∂qA,it
∂kit
(PMA,t − C ′it) + ∂qB,it∂kit (PXB,t − C ′it)
In this case, we have extra terms for the marginal value of FTRs if the owner
of FTRs have generation on the two sides of the transmission line.
Based on the institutions, I modify the empirical model in the following way:
pijt = β1E(SP )jt + β2E(var)jt + β3E(Market Power)ijt,imp
+β4E(Market Power)ijt,exp + β5FTRijt + β6 + β7annual + µi + ζj + ijt (4.24)
Bid price is on the LHS. There are three additional terms in this estimation equation
for generators: the term “Market Power” is to test whether FTRs’ strategic effect
on profit is significant in the bid price. As is discussed in earlier section, such an
effect can be both positive and negative. For generators only have generation in one
regional market or in multiple regional markets with the same direction of power flow
constraints, the Market Powerijt,imp is simply the own regional market power. For
generators have generation in multiple zones with opposite direction of power flow
constraints, this market power term is composed of two parts: Market Powerijt,imp
is the market power in the import-constrained market and Market Powerijt,exp is
the market power in the export-constrained market. The term µi is to control for
individual firm specific effects that the econometrician cannot observe.
3. Data
This section describes the measurement of each RHS variable from the data set. Since
the terms on RHS are in expectations, I take the average within the FTR defined time
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period as an approximation to the expectation. I focus in this paper on 5 generators
and a trader. These generators are active in the FTR auction and participated in
the the wholesale spot market, but their generation capacity as well as spot market
sale varies a lot which can be observed from the summary statistics about the bidders
after the descriptions of the measurements.
Expected Unit FTR Credit In measuring the expected unit FTR credit, we need
to average the realized shadow price over all time periods, not only congested
time periods. The reason is that when the bidder pays for the awarded amount
of FTRs, she is paying for all the time periods within the FTR defined time
length. So the expectation should also take into account the probability of
future congestion. For example, if the average anticipated shadow price is $10,
but congestion only occurs half of the entire period, the bidder should pay no
more than $5. Also we need to know how would bidders form their expectation.
In the following, I have two ways of measuring expected unit FTR credit, or
the shadow price:
• Measure 1: The expected shadow price is measured by the ex-post realized
shadow price of the corresponding transmission line averaged over all time
periods. If we find that bidders are hedging against this number, then they
perfectly forecast the future shadow price as well as the future probability
of congestion.
• Measure 2: The first measure assumes that the bidders are perfectly ra-
tional in that they can perfectly predict the future outcome given their
behavior on the first stage. A less-than-rational setting would be adapted
expectation in that the bidders use ex-ante information to infer the ex-
post realizations. The second measure use the ex-ante information on the
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wholesale electricity market. The expected shadow price is measured by
the ex-ante shadow price averaged over all periods in the earlier year or
month. For the annual auction, I use shadow price averaged over all time
periods in earlier year13. For the monthly auction, I use the realized shadow
price averaged over all time periods in the previous month.
Shadow Price Volatility There are 2 measures of volatility in shadow price corre-
sponding to the 2 measures of the expected shadow price. Namely, for the first
measure, I use the variance of shadow price in all the ex-post periods; for the
second measure, I use the variance of shadow price in all the ex-ante periods.
Market Power An ideal measurement of the market power based on equation (4.18)
would be to estimate both the price-cost margin and the dispatched quantity on
the wholesale real-time market. However, we should notice that since market
price is a function of the dispatched quantity, we can just measure the amount of
dispatched quantity on the balancing market as an approximate to the market
power effect. Also notice that since we combine the two FTR effects together,
the sign for the market power will be ambiguous. A perfect rational bidder
should base her expectation on the future amount of dispatched quantity on
the balancing market. If the bidder is less than rational, then a rough estimate
of her market power should be positively correlated with the ex-post dispatched
quantity on the balancing market. In my data, such a rough correlated measure
can be measured as the total metered generation on the wholesale electricity
13For the South to Houston shadow price, since in year 2001 there is no Houston
zone, I construct the annual South to Houston expected shadow price by using the
realization in January 2002, and discount by 20%: because in 2002, January is the
month with the most frequency of congestion and the summer months’ frequency of
congestion is only around 80% of the January one.
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market. To summarize, I have the following measures for measuring market
power:
• Balancing Market Sale (BMS): The measure here uses the ex-post mea-
sures. The balancing market sales include physical balancing power supply,
fulfilment of contract obligation on the balancing market and FTR owner-
ship. The physical balancing power supply q is measured by intersecting
bidder’s own bids on the wholesale balancing market with her residual
demand. The combination of contract obligation and FTR ownership is
measured by the intersection of bidder’s own bids with her marginal cost
curve. The intersection point is called QCobs
14. q−QCobs then can be used
as the total flexible quantity on the spot market.
• Metered Generation (MG): I use the ex-post measure of the average me-
tered generation across all time periods in hour 18 corresponding to the
FTR defined time length as an approximation to the market power.
Table XVI and Table XVII give summary statistics of some of the RHS variables of
equation (4.24).
Table XVII also reflects the fact that the two measures of market power are
positively correlated with each other.
In all the estimations, I study only the clearing bid point. The clearing bid
is constructed by intersecting the bidder’s own bid with her residual supply curve.
The residual supply curve is constructed by taking the aggregate supply (which is a
perfectly inelastic supply of the total available amount of FTRs), and subtract the
bidder’s rivals’ aggregate demand bid curve. The rationale to check the clearing bid
14Detailed measurement of q −QCobs can be found in Chapter III.
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Table XVI. Summary Statistics of Monthly Unit FTR Credit Volatility
Shadow Price Volatility
mean s.d. mean s.d.
South → Houston 3.79 3.33 1479.73 2682.02
South → North 4.00 5.64 2927.91 4710.33
West → North 2.02 4.23 1021.06 1419.88
Table XVII. Summary Statistics of Market Power Measures
North South West Houston
BMS MG BMS M.G. BMS MG BMS MG
s.d. s.d. s.d. s.d. s.d. s.d. s.d. s.d.
Bidder 1 51 1489 – – – – 759 5101
41 75 – – – – 242 1777
Bidder 2 362 6860 64 303 239 816 – –
124 1398 113 40 96 251 – –
Bidder 3 157 742 – – – – – –
42 119 – – – – – –
Bidder 4 120 96 – – – – – –
22 1 – – – – – –
Bidder 5 – – 45 176 – – – –
– – 27 61 – – – –
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is that on the RHS, the ex-post measures are corresponding to the awarded FTRs,
so the clearing bid point is the relevant bid point to check.
D. Estimation Results
In all the tables that report my estimation results, I use I, II to represent the two
measurements of the expected unit FTR credit (the shadow price) and corresponding
variance in the shadow price.
1. Trader’s Bidding Strategy
As a summary statistics, the trader in average holds 13% of the total available FTRs.
The trader wins over 70% of the entire time in the South-Houston and West-North
FTR auctions and wins over 50% of the time in the South-North FTR auctions.
The trader also participates in over 50% of the auctions. In view of these statistics,
the trader is very active in the FTR auctions. Table XVIII reports the estimates of
trader’s bidding strategy.
Expectation on Future Shadow Price By using different measures of expecta-
tions on future shadow price, it is clear that the trader very accurately forecasts
the future shadow price by using the first measure. The expectation is not
adapted from the earlier period. The coefficient for this measure is very signif-
icant and statistically equal to one. This result reflects the fact that the trader
is rational in making expectations on future shadow price of the transmission
line. For the second measure, not only the coefficient is very noisy, but the
mean of the coefficient is not even close to one, indicating that this measure is
irrelevant to the trader.
Future Shadow Price Uncertainty As was discussed in the theory sections, the
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Table XVIII. Traders Bidding Strategy
LHS variable: clearing bid
number of observations: 20
I II
coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
unit FTR credit 1.169* 0.328 0.301 0.279
Var(SP) -0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.000
FTR -0.025* 0.008 -0.021* 0.009
* indicates significance at 5% significance level.
future shadow price uncertainty will have two different impacts on the bidding
strategy. The first impact is in the value function – a risk averse player is willing
to pay risk premium if the uncertainty is high. On the other hand, the precision
of the uncertainty distribution will have impact on the bid shading strategy if
the valuation is affiliated: the higher the uncertainty, the more the bidder is
willing to shade her bids to avoid “winner’s curse” problem. In view of this, if
the coefficients are shown to be negative, we can say with confidence that the
valuations are affiliated among the bidders and the bid shading effects dominate
the risk premium amount. From our estimation results, we see that using the
first measure, the coefficient for uncertainty is significantly negative, indicating
that the bid shading due to value affiliation dominates risk premium. Again
the second measure is irrelevant to the trader’s bidding strategy.
Bid Shading The normal bid shading effect (in both IPV and AV models) is re-
flected in the coefficient with “FTR”. The estimation result for the first measure
80
reveals that the bid shading component is significant. This is consistent with
theory predictions that a large buyer with market power can shade her bids and
affect the market clearing price in the uniform price auction.
From the estimation results, we see that the trader is perfectly forecasting the future
shadow price of the transmission constraints and exercises market power. Through
the estimation results, we see that the valuations are affiliated among the bidders so
that the trader is shading more when it is more uncertain of the exact value of the
future shadow price of the transmission constraints. In all the auctions, the trader is
willing to pay more in the annual auctions holding everything else constant.
2. Generator’s Bidding Strategy
a. Pooling Large and Small Bidders
Table XIX and Table XX report the estimation results for generators’ bidding strat-
egy.
The estimation pools large and small bidders altogether. My following discus-
sion will be focusing on the fixed effect estimation results if the estimates from fixed
effect estimations are different from OLS estimations.
Expectation on Future Shadow Price The OLS as well as the fixed effects re-
gression reflect that the first measure of the future shadow price fits better with
theory predictions. The coefficient for the first measure is very significant and
statistically equal to one. This coefficient indicates that at the mean, the bid-
ders are forecasting quite well of the future shadow price. Similar to the trader’s
estimation results, the second measure is not significant at 5% significance level.
Future Shadow Price Uncertainty Using the first measure, both the OLS and
fixed effects regressions reveal that the bid shading effect statistically dominates
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Table XIX. Generator’s Bidding Strategy (Market power uses q −QC)
LHS: clear bid, 62 obs.
I II
OLS F.E. OLS F.E.
coef. coef. coef. coef.
s.e s.e s.e s.e
unit FTR credit 1.311* 1.254* 0.218 -0.016
0.547 0.480 0.195 0.228
Var(SP) -0.001* -0.001* 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Market Powerimp 0.004* 0.003 0.006* 0.001
0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
Market Powerexp -0.011* -0.002 -0.012 0.007
0.005 0.010 0.008 0.010
FTR -0.001 -0.020 0.004 -0.020
0.014 0.013 0.012 0.013
* indicates significance at 5% significance level, ** indicates significance at 10% significance level.
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Table XX. Generator’s Bidding Strategy (Market power uses metergen)
LHS: clearing bid, 71 obs.
I II
OLS F.E. OLS F.E.
coef. coef. coef. coef.
s.e s.e s.e s.e
unit FTR credit 1.341* 1.435* 0.274** 0.082
0.481 0.405 0.162 0.194
Var(SP) -0.001* -0.001* 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Market Powerimp 0.001* 0.000 0.001* 0.001**
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Market Powerexp -0.006* -0.001 -0.009* -0.003
0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003
FTR 0.001 -0.018 0.005 -0.011
0.014 0.013 0.011 0.012
* indicates significance at 5% significance level, ** indicates significance at 10% significance level.
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the risk premium payment. This again confirms that the valuations are affiliated
among the bidders.
Market Power In all the fixed effect estimations, the market power effect is not
significant in all the measures. In the following subsection, I will test the ro-
bustness of this result including the examination of the endogeneity problem
for the estimations.
Bid Shading By pooling all the bidders, the bid shading effect is not significant in
the fixed effect estimates – indicating that bidders are not exercising market
power. However, since we are pooling large and small bidders together, there
might be the case that the insignificant shading effect is dominated by small
bidders who do not have much market power in the FTR auction. I will check
the robustness of this result again in the following subsection.
In all the estimates, the bidders are willing to pay more in the annual auction.
b. Robustness
For a robustness check, I re-group the bidders so that their bidding behaviors can be
observed more closely. Table XXI collects several statistics that reveal the hetero-
geneity among the bidders.
From Table XXI, we see that there are a lot of heterogeneity among the bidders:
some bidders hold large percentage of the entire amount of FTRs (almost reach the
percentage limit which is 25%) while some bidders hold on average no more than
1% of the total amount of FTRs. In terms of participation, some bidders participate
almost in every round of auctions while some bidders participate no more than one
third of the entire auctions. In view of this, I re-group the bidders so that the bidding
strategies can be similar within each group. I categorize the bidders into large bidders
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Table XXI. Bidders Participation Statistics
LHS: clearing bid, 71 obs.
I II III IV
Bidder1 S-N 0.023 0.167 0 0.462
Bidder1 W-N 0.141 0.667 1 0.462
Bidder1 S-H 0.235 0.778 1 0.692
Bidder2 S-N 0.234 0.500 1 0.769
Bidder2 W-N 0.233 0.500 1 0.615
Bidder2 S-H 0.233 0.857 1 0.538
Bidder3 S-N 0.013 0.333 0 0.692
Bidder3 W-N 0.068 0.444 1 0.692
Bidder4 S-N 0.014 0.600 0 0.385
Bidder4 W-N 0.002 0.333 0 0.231
Bidder5 S-N 0.004 0.400 0 0.385
I: amount of FTR owned as a percentage of total available FTRs = FTRit
totalF TRi
II: percentage of time that is awarded the FTRs = (number of times awarded FTR)/(total number of times
participated)
III: 1 indicates the ownership of annual FTR, 0 otherwise
IV: percentage of time that the bidder participated in the auctions = (total number of times participated)/(total
number of times FTRs are auctioned)
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with the following criteria: 1) ownership of FTRs is over 20% of the total FTRs; 2)
the percentage of time that the bidder wins the auction is over 50% of the time that
she participates; 3) owns annual FTRs, and 4) participation in the FTR auction is
over 50% of the total rounds of auctions conducted by the grid operator. “Bidder1
S-H”, “Bidder2 S-N”, “Bidder2 W-N” and “Bidder2 S-H” are grouped into this “large
bidder” group. The others are grouped into the “small bidder” group. Table XXII
and Table XXIII report the estimation results about large bidders.
Comparing the large bidders’ bidding strategy with our earlier estimation re-
sults, we see that the majority of the findings are very consistent:
• the bidders are forecasting future expected shadow price using the first measure;
• the bidders are shading significantly not only in the regular terms (which is
reflected in the coefficient with FTR), but they also shade more due to more
uncertainty of the future shadow price.
• The significant coefficient associated with FTR reveals that large bidders are
able to exercise market power in the FTR auctions by shading from their valu-
ation.
• Again using both measures, the market power term is not significant,
A major significant change from our earlier results (Table XIX and Table XX) is that
large bidders “over-pay” on the expected future shadow price using the first measure,
in that the coefficient now is far above the theory implication of one. This means
that the bidders are expecting too high on future shadow price. The result is also
consistent with the fact that in the first year, the bidders are paying above the ex-post
realized shadow price for the FTRs. Conditioning on other factors, large bidders are
expecting too high on future unit FTR credit.
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Table XXII. Large Bidders’ Bidding Strategy (Market power uses q −QC)
LHS: clearing bid, 29 obs.
I II
OLS F.E. OLS F.E.
coef. coef. coef. coef.
s.e s.e s.e s.e
unit FTR credit 1.532* 2.115* 0.228 0.121
0.635 0.495 0.343 0.323
Var(SP) -0.001* -0.002* 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Market Powerimp 0.004 0.000 0.004 -0.002
0.003 0.004 0.003 0.006
Market Powerexp -0.010** -0.008 -0.017** 0.014
0.006 0.011 0.009 0.013
FTR -0.015 -0.045* -0.007 -0.033
0.017 0.016 0.016 0.021
* indicates significance at 5% significance level, ** indicates significance at 10% significance level.
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Table XXIII. Large Bidders’ Bidding Strategy (Market power uses metergen)
LHS: clearing bid, 32 obs.
I II
OLS F.E. OLS F.E.
coef. coef. coef. coef.
s.e s.e s.e s.e
unit FTR credit 1.692* 2.458* 0.443 0.324
0.554 0.450 0.287 0.282
Var(SP) -0.001* -0.002* 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Market Powerimp 0.001** -0.001 0.001** 0.001
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Market Powerexp -0.005** 0.004 -0.008* -0.08
0.002 0.005 0.003 0.006
FTR -0.010 -0.051* -0.001 -0.022
0.017 0.015 0.015 0.020
* indicates significance at 5% significance level, ** indicates significance at 10% significance level.
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Table XXIV. Small Bidders’ Bidding Strategy (Market power uses q −QC)
LHS: clearing bid, 33 obs.
I II
OLS F.E. OLS F.E.
coef. coef. coef. coef.
s.e s.e s.e s.e
unit FTR credit 1.076 -0.547 0.126 0.029
0.893 0.942 0.256 0.252
Var(SP) -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Market Power 0.018 0.020 0.014 0.017
0.010 0.018 0.009 0.014
FTR 0.036 -0.008 0.025 -0.005
0.019 0.032 0.016 0.025
* indicates significance at 5% significance level, ** indicates significance at 10% significance level.
Table XXIV and Table XXV report the estimation results about small bidders.
The estimation for small bidders are very noisy, indicating that the small bidders
are not able to either forecast future price systematically or exercise market power.
This also reveals that the smaller magnitude of the first coefficient estimate in Table
XIX and Table XX than the estimate in Table XXII and XXIII for large bidders
is because the dilution by the noisy strategies from the small bidders. Also the
insignificance results of bid shading in Table XIX and Table XX are due to the
inability of small bidders to exercise market power.
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Table XXV. Small Bidder’s Bidding Strategy (Market power uses metergen)
LHS: clearing bid, 39 obs.
I II
OLS F.E. OLS F.E.
coef. coef. coef. coef.
s.e s.e s.e s.e
unit FTR credit 0.936 0.132 0.116 -0.007
0.828 0.766 0.222 0.195
Var(SP) -0.001 0.000 0.000* 0.000*
0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Market Power 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.008
0.001 0.006 0.001 0.005
FTR 0.013 0.008 0.001 -0.001
0.020 0.028 0.018 0.022
* indicates significance at 5% significance level, ** indicates significance at 10% significance level.
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Another concern about the robustness of the estimation result is that if the
bidders are able to exercising market power on the subsequent power market, then
the choice of FTRs and the consequent supply and market price will all be endogenous
to the firm rather than exogenously given. The endogenous variables can be the ex-
post shadow price measure, the ex-post quantity on the balancing market and the
amount of FTR chosen. To test for the endogeneity issue, I selected the following
variables as exogenous instruments to the system:
• Shadow price t−1. This is under the assumption that the shadow price realized
in the earlier period is not controlled by the firm at current time t, or the current
market condition does not cause earlier market outcome. This is essentially the
second measure of the shadow price.
• Number of total FTRs to be auctioned. This is public information that every
bidder knows before she goes to the auction and is exogenous to the auction
strategies.
• Frequency of outage. In ERCOT’s study, in the months of March, April, Oc-
tober and November, there are more frequent transmission and generation out-
ages. I use a dummy equal to one indicating those months. I also dummy the
month of July and August as one because they are summer peak months.
• Number of bidders in the auction. Total number of bidders are not known to
the auction participants before the auction. However, I use this statistic as an
exogenous variable to approximate the intensity of the auction. The bidders
should have some beliefs as to whether the auction will receive more attention
or not and such exogenous factor will affect the bidders’ bidding behavior.
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By using the above instruments, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistics report that ac-
tually for the trader and small bidders, there are no endogeneity problems for earlier
estimations15. For large bidders, statistics strongly support that endogeneity exists.
This is not a surprise because for trader and small bidders, they do not have much
influence on the wholesale market outcome, so that their expectation of market out-
come should be exogenous to them, in that they are not able to “choose” a particular
outcome. For large bidders, due to their market power, they can expect particular
market outcome that they can “choose”, or in other words, endogenous to them.
Table XXVI reports the IV estimation results using the above instruments for large
bidders. Since their market powers are mostly reflected in the balancing market bid-
ding, I include here only the variable measuring “market power” using the ex-post
balancing market outcome instrumented by the above instruments. The price mea-
sure is using the ex-post shadow price again instrumented by the above instruments.
Also the FTR amount is assumed to be endogenous and instrumented by the above
instruments. The estimation uses panel level fixed effect and corrects for panel-wise
heteroscedasticity.
A striking result is that after controlling for the endogeneity, FTRs’ impact on
market power becomes significant in the bidding strategy. Another distinction is that
the expectation on future unit FTR credit is biased upward greater than our previous
estimates for large bidders. Again the valuation structure is revealed to be affiliated
because the bid shading effect from uncertainty dominates risk premium payment.
Large bidders are able to exercise market power in the FTR auction which is reflected
by the significant shading factor attached to the FTR amount in their bids.
15The Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic for the trader’s estimation is 1.17, which con-
firms the null hypothesis that OLS is consistent with a Chi-square distribution with
2 degrees of freedom. For the small bidders, the statistic is 4.32. Under a Chi-square
distribution with 3 degrees of freedom, the null hypothesis is again confirmed.
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Table XXVI. Large Bidders’ Bidding Strategy (IV estimates) (Market power uses
q −QC)
LHS: clearing bid, 32 obs.
coef. s.e
unit FTR credit 7.709* 2.310
Var(SP) -.006* .002
Market Powerimp .026* .013
Market Powerexp -.185 .121
FTR -.105* .036
* indicates significance at 5% significance level, ** indicates significance at 10% significance level.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
This research empirically addresses the question on the electricity market as to what
the FTR price tells us. To answer this question, I empirically study FTRs’ impacts on
bidders’ strategic behaviors as well as such strategic behaviors’ impact on FTR prices.
This research also contributes to the recently developed literature of empirical study
of multi-unit auctions and uniform-price auctions in particular. By using rich data
on the electricity market, I am able to test some of the major empirical implications
from multi-unit auction theories.
The first part of this dissertation empirically examines the impact of FTRs on
firm’s bidding strategies on the wholesale electricity market in Texas. I focus on the
two largest players in the Texas electricity market – Reliant in the Houston zone and
TXU in the North zone. I find bidding behaviors converge towards theoretical equi-
librium predictions over time with respect to firms’ physical inframarginal capacity.
With respect to FTRs, bidding strategies are converging towards optimal bidding
during the course of the first year, but deviated from optimal bidding starting from
the last period of the sample. Quantitatively, during my sample periods when FTRs
are statistically significant (β2 is significant) in players’ bidding strategy, Reliant’s
markup is marginally affected by FTRs around 23 cents and 28 cents in Period 2 and
Period 3 respectively, while TXU around $1.99 in Period 3. Counterfactual studies
show that the FTR effects are mostly reflected through market price level changes
rather than production efficiency. Considering demand uncertainty, the current al-
location of FTRs is not statistically different from optimal FTR allocation in most
months. If the market is mostly cleared at the decreasing production side, then the
allocation of FTRs would improve market price signal efficiency. Compared with
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counterfactual scenarios where no FTRs are allocated, optimal allocations of FTRs
statistically increase spot market price signal efficiency for most of the months on the
wholesale electricity market.
The second part of the dissertation studies bidding strategies in the FTR auctions
and serves to detect whether FTRs’ strategic impacts on the wholesale market would
be reflected in the FTR prices. I prescribe a methodology that tests bidders’ bidding
behavior and price components in FTRs by studying the year 2002 FTR auctions.
Theory implies that the difference in bidding between traders and generators can
be explained by generator’s market power. By integrating bidders ex-post wholesale
market auction behavior with the FTR auction together, I develop empirical models
that allows the testings of theory predictions.
My empirical results for the bidding strategy in the FTR auctions show that
the trader can very accurately forecast future shadow price and is able to exercising
market power by shading its bids from its marginal valuation of FTRs. The estimation
of generators’ bidding strategies concludes that generators also bid on the expected
future shadow price and such expectations are not adapted from earlier periods.
For large bidders, their forecasts of future unit FTR credit biased upward, but the
correlation with realized shadow price is still positive and very significant. For small
bidders, they are not able to accurately forecast future shadow price consistently and
the estimates for bids’ correlation with realized shadow price is very noisy. In terms
of market power in FTR auctions, large bidders are able to exercise market power by
shading their bids from their marginal value of FTRs. Small bidders are not able to
exercise market power and the coefficient estimates are again very noisy.
The valuation structure are revealed to be affiliated among the bidders in the
FTR auctions. In all the estimation results for traders and large bidders, the bid
shading effect resulted from value affiliation dominates the risk premium payment.
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The more uncertain the future shadow price is, the more the bidders wish to shade
down from their valuation.
After correcting endogeneity issues in the bidding strategy, the FTRs’ market
power effect is significant in the bids for large bidders but not for small bidders. In
Chapter III, I find that firms significantly included FTRs into their bidding strategy
starting the second half of the year. Such an effect is significantly reflected through
the bidding strategy in the FTR auction for those large bidders and hence the FTR
prices are affected by the market power on the wholesale market.
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APPENDIX A
ERCOT SHADOW PRICE CALCULATION

MCPEsystem
SPSN
SPSH
SPWN

=

1 −SFN,SN −SFN,SH −SFN,WN
1 −SFS,SN −SFS,SH −SFS,WN
1 −SFW,SN −SFW,SH −SFW,WN
1 −SFH,SN −SFH,SH −SFH,WN

−1
×

MCPEN
MCPES
MCPEW
MCPEH

(A.1)
Note: SP stands for Shadow Price, SF stands for Shift Factor, subscripts represent zones. MCPE represents Market
Clearing Price for Electricity. For example: SPSN represents shadow price for transmission line from south to north;
SFN,SN represents shift factor in the north zone on the directional transmission line from south to north.
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APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF FOC FROM EQUATION (3.4)
Integration by parts, we have
∫ p¯
0
piitdH(p, Sit(pt)) = piitH(p, Sit(p, Sit)|p¯0 −
∫ p¯
0
H(p, yit(p, sit))
dpiit
dp
dp (B.1)
Notice that
dpiit
dp
= pS ′it + Sit − C ′itS ′it (B.2)
Equation (B.1) can be re-written as
∫ p¯
0
piitdH(p, Sit(pt)) = piitH(p, Sit(p, Sit)|p¯0 −
∫ p¯
0
H(p, yit(p, sit))(pS
′
it + Sit − C ′itS ′it)dp
(B.3)
The first part in equation (B.3) is a constant so that we ignore that part in the
derivation of first order condition. Define
F = H(p, yit(p, sit))(pS
′
it + Sit − C ′itS ′it), (B.4)
the integrand, the Euler equation is given by
FS =
dFS′
dp
(B.5)
using equation (B.4), FS = HS(pS
′
it + Sit − C ′itS ′it) +H, FS′ = H(p− C ′it) ⇒ dFS′dp =
Hp(p− C ′it) +HS′S(p− C ′it) +H. Then our first order condition of equation (3.5) is
derived by applying the Euler equation (B.5).
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APPENDIX C
SIMPLIFICATION OF HS
HP
Proof:
H(p, s(p)) = Pr(pc < p|S(p)) (C.1)
⇒
H(p, s(p)) = Pr(S(p) > D˜(p)|Si(p)) (C.2)
⇒
H(p, s(p)) = Pr(Si + S−i > D˜(p)|Si(p)) (C.3)
If we assume that Si(p,QCi, FTRi) = αi(p) + βi(QCi, FTRi) ∀i, then
H(p, s(p)) = Pr(αi(p) + βi(QCi, FTRi) + α−i(p) + β−i(QC−i, FTR−i)
> D¯(p) + |Si(p)) (C.4)
⇒
H(p, s(p)) = Pr(β−i(QC−i, FTR−i)−  > D¯(p)− Si − α−i(p)) (C.5)
Based on the above H function, we can deriv Hs and Hp. Let F (D¯(p)− Si − α−i(p))
be the cumulative distribution, then H(p, s(p)) = 1−F (D¯(p)− Si−α−i(p)); let f(·)
be the corresponding density function.
Hs(·) = ∂H∂S = ∂(1−F (D¯(p)−Si−α−i(p)))∂S
= −f(D¯(p)Si − α−i(p))∂(D¯(p)− Si − α−i(p))
∂Si
(C.6)
Hp(·) = ∂H∂p = ∂(1−F (D¯(p)−Si−α−i(p))∂p
= −f(D¯(p)− Si − α−i(p))∂(D¯(p)− Si − α−i(p))
∂p
(C.7)
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Notice that ∂(D¯(p)−Si−α−i(p))
∂Si
= −1 and ∂(D¯(p)−Si−α−i(p))
∂p
= D¯′(p) − α′−i(p) = RD′(p).
Combine the above equations (C.6) and (C.7) together, we get
HS
Hp
= − 1
RD′(p)
(C.8)
Q.E.D.
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APPENDIX D
RISK AVERSE
Assume that the utility function of a risk averse bidder is1
u(piit) = −e−γpiit (D.1)
The expected utility maximization problem becomes:
max
Sit(pct )
Upiit =
∫ p¯
0
u(piit)dH(p, Sit(pt)) =
∫ p¯
0
−e−γpiitdH(p, Sit(pt)) (D.2)
Integration by parts, we get
∫ p¯
0
u(piit)dH(p, Sit(pt)) = u(piit)H(p, Sit(p, Sit)|p¯0 −
∫ p¯
0
H(p, yit(p, sit)
du(piit)
dp
dp (D.3)
Again the first term is a constant, and the second term can be re-written as
− ∫ p¯0 H(p, yit(p, sit))− re−γpiit dpidpdp
=
∫ p¯
0
H(p, yit(p, sit))re
−γpiit(pS ′it + Sit − C ′itS ′it)dp (D.4)
Let
F = H(p, yit(p, sit))re
−γpiit(p′Sit + Sit − C ′itS ′it), (D.5)
then
FS = HSre
−γpiit(pS ′it+Sit−C ′itS ′it)−Hr2e−γpiit(pS ′it+Sit−C ′itS ′it)(p−C ′)+Hre−γpiit ,
(D.6)
FS′ = Hre
−γpiit(p− C ′) (D.7)
⇒
1The utility function used is just for illustration purpose in this exercise. The
result applies to any risk averse utility functional forms.
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dFS′
dp
= Hpre
−γpiit(p− C ′) +HSS ′re−γpiit(p− C ′)
−Hr2e−γpiit(pS ′it + Sit − C ′itS ′it)(p− C ′) +Hre−γpiit (D.8)
By applying Euler equation FS =
dFS′
dp
for first order condition, we get exactly the
same first order condition as is in equation (3.5)
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APPENDIX E
DERIVATION OF EQUATION (4.11) FOR IPV MODEL
Our equation (4.5) can be written as: Uit =
∫∞
0 piitdH(p, kit(p, sit), with the profit pi
being:
pi =
∫ k(p)
0 V (kit(p), si)dk − k(p)p
Integral by parts, we get:
∫ ∞
0
piitdH(p, kit(p, sit) = piitH(p, kit(p, sit)|∞0 −
∫ k(p)
0
H(p, kit(p, sit)
dpiit
dp
dp (E.1)
Notice that
∂pi
∂p
=
∫ k(p)
0 (dV (kit(p), si)/dp)dk + V (kit(p), si)k
′(p)− k(p)− k′(p)p
= V (kit(p), si)k
′(p)− k(p)− k′(p)p = (V (k(p), si)− p)k′(p)− k(p) (E.2)
Equation (E.1) can be re-written as:
∫ ∞
0
piitdH(p, kit(p, sit) = −
∫ ∞
0
H(p, kit(p, sit)[(V (k(p), si))− p)k′(p)− k(p)]dp (E.3)
Let F = H(p, kit(p, sit)[(V (k(p), si) − p)k′(p) − k(p)], the integrand, then the Euler
equation is given by
Fk =
dFk′(p)
dp
(E.4)
By using equation (E.4), we get our necessary condition for optimality which is
V (k(p), si) = p+ k
−Hk
Hp
(E.5)
Q.E.D
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APPENDIX F
DERIVATION OF EQUATION (4.13) FOR AV MODE
In AV model,
Uit =
∫ ∞
0
[
∫ k(pc)
0
V (kit(p), si, p)dk]− k(p)pdH(pc, k(pc, si) (F.1)
Similar as we have in the previous proof, the static profit can be written as piit =
[
∫ k(pc)
0 V (kit(p), si, p)dk]− k(p)p, Integral by parts, we get:
∫ ∞
0
piitdH(p, kit(p, sit) = piitH(p, kit(p, sit)|∞0 −
∫ k(p)
0
H(p, kit(p, sit)
dpiit
dp
dp (F.2)
Notice that this time,
∂pi
∂p
=
∫ k(p)
0 (dV (kit(p), si)/dp)dk + V (kit(p), si)k
′(p)− k(p)− k′(p)p
= V (kit(p), si)k
′(p)− k(p)− k′(p)p
=
∫ k(p)
0
(dV (kit(p), si)/dp)dk + (V (k(p), si)− p)k′(p)− k(p) (F.3)
So that our utility function Uit can be reduced to :
−
∫ k(p)
0
H(p, kit(p, sit)[
∫ k(p)
0
(dV (kit(p), si)/dp)dk + (V (k(p), si)− p)k′(p)− k(p)]dp
(F.4)
Again let F = H(p, kit(p, sit)[
∫ k(p)
0 (dV (kit(p), si)/dp)dk+(V (k(p), si)−p)k′(p)−k(p)],
use the Euler equation, we can get the necessary condition as:
V (kit(p), si, p) = p+ k
−Hk
Hp
+
Hk
Hp
∫ k(pc)
0
∂V (kit(p), si, p)
∂p
dk (F.5)
Q.E.D
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